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One of the statutory duties of the Office of Energy Regulation of the Netherlands Competition Authority 
(NMa) is to keep a close eye on the wholesale markets for electricity and gas. The results of this periodic 
monitoring are used to formulate proposals for measures that the NMa or the Minister of Economic Affairs 
can take to improve the functioning of these markets. Unlike in previous years, this year the analysis of the 
gas market and that of the electricity market have been combined in a single report, which consequently 
offers a convenient overview of the relevant developments in both these energy markets.  
 
In preparing this report, grateful use was made of contributions from various external parties. The electricity 
market was discussed in a feedback group with representatives of producers, traders and lobby 
organisations. The results of the analysis of the gas market were also discussed with a number of market 
parties. Three workshops were also held in order to get a better view on the relationship between the gas and 
electricity markets. The NMa is of course fully responsible for the content of this report.  
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1.  The Dutch wholesale markets for energy are still impeded by various bottlenecks, as a result of which the 
costs for energy consumers are higher than they should be in well-functioning markets. Simply making 
more efficient use of the import infrastructure could save energy consumers several tens of millions of 
euros. The bottlenecks occur primarily in the gas market, where various impediments are impeding the 
quicker introduction of competition.  
 
2.  The following actions are needed to improve the functioning of the gas market:  
a.  Investments in import capacity by the operator of the gas transport network (GTS); 
b.  Improvements to the allocation of current import capacity;  
c.  Improved access for market parties to the existing facilities for gas storage, after a balanced 
analysis of all the effects thereof;  
d.  Introduction of a market based balancing regime as soon as possible;  
e.  Implementation of the legal regulation proposed by the Minister that gas may only be 
transferred on the TTF from now on and that more standardised contracts become available.  
 
3.  The following is necessary to improve the functioning of the electricity market:  
a.  More import capacity must become available, among other means by the introduction of market 
coupling on the Dutch-German border;  
b.  Impediments to connecting new power plants to the national network must be removed (as 
efficiently as possible);  
c.  Improvement to the functioning of the gas market (see point 2).  
 
4.  The operators of the high pressure network for gas and the high voltage network for electricity 
(transmission system operators – TSOs) must take a more proactive approach to facilitating competition 
on the wholesale markets, which also means that they must make more manpower and resources 
available for this. These activities are important to the functioning of the market, such as investing in 
new capacity, making capacity (more) available, improving the allocation of capacity among players on 
the market and providing information to market parties. Because of the close relationships between the 
national networks the TSOs must jointly come up with comprehensive plans to make more efficient use 
of existing infrastructure and develop new infrastructure.  
 
5.  For further European integration of national energy markets, the national regulators, TSOs and 
governments will have to cooperate more. Supervision on the energy markets will also be benefited by 
the arrival of a strong and independent European regulator, which will make it possible to take action 
faster and more effectively.  
  
6.  The functioning of the gas market is impeded by market players’ limited access to both import pipelines 
and seasonal flexibility, the lack of a (market) mechanism to efficiently meet balancing requirements and 
limitations on purchasing and trading in gas on the TTF market.  
 
7.  In order to increase the opportunities for importing gas, GTS must invest more in capacity and improve 
the allocation of the current capacity. The open season for import capacity recently held by GTS will 
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too much of the investment risk. It is important that this capacity is also made available for the short-
term demand. In addition, the existing use it or lose it mechanism should be better applied.  
 
8.  The market for seasonable flexibility can be improved by making the current storage facilities more 
available to (other) market parties. Market parties will consequently be less dependent on the largest 
supplier and the facilities will be used more efficiently. An additional argument for this is that the need to 
reserve this storage partly for security of supply is declining since in a liquid gas market with a market-
based balancing regime the demand response (from electricity producers, among others) contributes to 
the security of the gas supply. With consideration for the investment climate for new storage, clarity is 
needed soon, after a balanced analysis of all effects, on whether and to what extent these gas storage 
facilities can be used by the market. 
 
9.  The lack of a market-based balancing regime is a major impediment to the functioning of the gas market. 
It is essential that the current regime be replaced as soon as possible with a system that is in line with 
market principles. The deadline of 1 January 2010 mentioned by the Minister of Economic Affairs in her  
Gas Letter to Parliament must be the absolute deadline; GTS must make every effort to realise the new 
system well before this date.  
 
10.  In order to realise the necessary development of the TTF into a liquid trading platform, the proposals 
made earlier by the NMa and partly adopted by the Minister of Economic Affairs must be fully 
implemented. It must be quickly ensured that all gas is transferred on the TTF from now on, where it can 
be traded, and that more standardised contracts become available.  
 
11.  The functioning of the electricity market is impeded by inefficient utilisation of the cross-border 
connections with Germany and the high concentration of supply, as a result of which producers 
encounter limited competitive pressure, especially during peak hours. As in the last Monitor report, we 
also saw in 2007 that the market outcomes are related to the market position of individual companies: 
the more producers are needed to meet demand, the higher the price of electricity. Although there is a 
clear correlation between the high concentration in supply and the level of the electricity price and there 
are indications that production companies use their strong market position to influence the market 
outcomes, no proof has been found to confirm this suggestion.  
 
12.  In order to better utilise the import capacity for electricity, it is essential that the already proposed 
coupling of the Dutch market with that of Germany and Norway be realised in the short term. 
Experiences with market coupling with Belgium and France show that the cross-border connections are 
made more efficient use of as a result. The utilisation of import capacity also improves when capacity 
that is not used is traded intra-day, which would require that the TSOs provide for this on the borders 
with Germany and Belgium.  
 
13.  The competition on the electricity market will improve when the existing plans for the construction of 
new (large and small) power plants are realised. It is important therefore that possible impediments to 
this construction, such as limited availability of transmission capacity, be removed (as efficiently as 
possible) by the national (TenneT) and regional network operators.  
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1.  One of the statutory duties of the Office of Energy Regulation of the Netherlands Competition Authority 
(NMa Energiekamer) is to keep a close eye on the Dutch wholesale markets for electricity and gas. The 
aim of this monitoring is to determine whether there are impediments to competition in the wholesale 
markets and what measures the NMa or Minister of Economic Affairs could take to remove these 
impediments.  
 
2.  The monitoring of competition in the wholesale markets consists of comparing observed developments 
with benchmarks of the ideal situation. Ideally the quality and quantity of the infrastructure would be 
such that any change to it (expansion or contraction) would lead to welfare losses. The infrastructure 
must also be accessible, in principle, to all market parties under conditions which take into account the 
necessary compensation of investment costs and ensure that the decisions to use the infrastructure are 
made as efficiently as possible. Competitive markets are also characterised by a market structure in 
which market parties are not able to exercise market power and prices are determined by the marginal 
costs of supply. In addition, trading platforms must be liquid enough so that standard transactions can 
be carried out quickly and efficiently.  
 
Infrastructure 
3.  The infrastructure for the import of high calorific gas is not efficiently utilised. Although the capacity is 
fully booked, it is used fully during only a limited number of hours. Shippers lack the possibility of 
utilizing unused capacity to arbitrate between the spot markets in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium. As a result, gas customers, including electricity companies, pay an extra 10 to 20 million euros 
per year for their gas.  
 
4.  In order to increase the possibilities for importing gas, GTS must invest more in capacity and improve 
the allocation of current capacity. The open season for capacity held recently by GTS did not yield enough 
because the shippers bore too much of the investment risk. It is important that this capacity is also made 
available for the short-term demand. The existing import capacity can be better utilised by improving the 
application of the existing use it or lose it mechanism. Improvement can also be achieved by trading 
unused transport capacity via a secondary market, for which a trial was recently started. The provision of 
information about the availability of import capacity must also be improved. Increasing transparency in 
the short term is therefore an important aim of the regulators and network operators (TSOs) in North 
West Europe.  
 
5.  Capacity for quality conversion until recently was, like import capacity, also fully booked, but not fully 
utilised. Consequently shippers are part of the time unable to make use of the infrastructure while it is,in 
physical terms, available. This bottleneck was already recognised in the previous gas monitor and was 
addressed by the Minister of Economic Affairs in her Gas Letter to Parliament. GTS and GasTerra have 
now made agreements so that GTS has been able, since 1 July 2008, to satisfy all requests for quality 
conversion with the current volume of the demand.  
 
6.  Infrastructure for seasonal gas storage is almost never fully utilised. Nonetheless market parties 
encounter poor access to storage facilities. This is due to the fact that the operators largely reserve the 
storage facilities for their own use, specifically to support the production from the small fields (GasTerra) 
and for security of supply purposes(GTS). The market for seasonal flexibility can be improved by making 
the existing storage facilities more available to (other) market parties. This would not only make market NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  8
parties less dependent on the largest supplier, but these facilities would also be more efficiently utilised. 
An extra argument for this is that the need to reserve parts of these storage facilities for the sake of 
security of supply is declining, since in a liquid gas market with a market-based balancing regime the 
demand response (by electricity producers, among others) contributes to the security of gas supply. With 
consideration for the investment climate for new storage, clarity is needed soon, after a balanced analysis 
of all effects, on whether and to what extent these gas storage facilities can be used by the market. 
 
7.  The market for short-term gas flexibility has improved over the past years thanks to the arrival of the so-
called combiflex product, which provides market parties with the opportunity to obtain flexibility from the 
operator of the high pressure network (GTS). The aforementioned improvement in access to quality 
conversion also benefits the market for short-term flexibility.  
 
Competition 
8.  The Dutch gas market has traditionally been a highly concentrated one. Especially the low calorific 
market is virtually monopolised in some segments. There was hardly any change to this situation in 
2007. Concentration decreased in most segments of the high calorific market in 2007, but the market is 
still concentrated with an HHI well above the benchmark of 1,800. 
 
9.  Competition on the gas market is limited by a number of obstacles for new entrants. Shippers see the 
scarcity of firm import capacity as one of the biggest barriers on the Dutch gas market. Interruptible 
capacity is not seen as an alternative because of the risk of interruption and the fines for imbalance 
linked with this.  
 
10.  Hourly balancing in combination with the high imbalance levies is a serious impediment for new 
entrants with a small portfolio. Furthermore, shippers still have insufficient steering information for 
managing the imbalance risks. This leads to inefficient outcomes because the levies for shippers with 
imbalance often bear no relation to the actual (im)balance situation on the whole network. The progress 
made in the area of steering information in 2007 is seen as positive, but not yet adequate. It is very 




11.  Despite the growth in volume, the TTF market is still insufficiently liquid. The large majority of the gas 
(more than 90%) is still traded outside TTF. This is the case for H gas and even more for L gas, which 
could hardly be obtained at all on TTF in 2007. The growth of TTF in 2007 declined once again compared 
to the previous year, giving rise to a trend. This declining trend has, incidentally, come to an end in the 
first half of 2008. The variety in products is still limited. Trade is mainly in long-term products, such as 
year-ahead. The day-ahead trade is low, just as in past years, and there is hardly any within-day trade. 
This means that market parties can only turn to the TTF to a limited degree to meet their needs for 
balancing and sourcing. 
 
12.  The Minister of Economic Affairs has announced legal measures which stipulate that gas must be 
transferred on the TTF, where it can be traded. It is however also important that more standardised 
contracts become available, which will increase the tradability of the gas. Once these measures have 
been realised, the trade volume and liquidity of the TTF will be able to increase significantly.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  9
 
Infrastructure 
13.  The average (physical) utilisation of the import capacity was lower in 2007 than in 2006. This is mainly 
due to a clear decrease in utilisation of the import capacity on the Dutch-Belgian border that is related to 
changing price ratios between these countries at the end of the year. At the same time we see that the 
number of hours that this connection is fully utilised has clearly increased. Market coupling with Belgium 
and France has resulted here in a more efficient utilisation of the infrastructure.  
 
14.  The utilisation rate of the import capacity at the Dutch-German border fell slightly compared with 2006 
and the number of hours of full utilisation was comparable. Separate day-ahead auctions of border 
capacity (at TSO Auction) and the commodity electricity (on power markets) prevent the interconnection 
capacity from always being fully utilised when price differences occur between the two countries. If the 
infrastructure were optimally utilised, it would save electricity users between 10 and 20 million euros per 
year. It is therefore important that market coupling be introduced on the Dutch-German border as soon 
as possible.  
 
15.  The utilisation of import capacity also improves when capacity that is not used is traded intra-day, which 
would require that the TSOs provide for this on the borders with Germany and Belgium.  
 
Competition 
16.  The electricity market is still a concentrated market. A large part of the available production capacity is in 
the hands of a few companies, while these companies also account for the lion’s share of the production. 
In comparison with 2006, the market position of individual players became even stronger in 2007. There 
were more hours in which one or more players were indispensable to satisfy demand. It turned out that 
the pivotality of players is closely related to the electricity price: the more pivotal players were in a 
particular hour, the higher the price in that hour.  
 
17.  It is not entirely clear to what extent market power was used by companies to influence market 
outcomes. Although there are indications of strategic behaviour, these cannot be seen as proof. The 
dispatch of power plants turns out to be less efficient than it could be. In 2007 this dispatch inefficiency 
was almost double what it was in 2006. We also see a remarkable difference in dispatch inefficiency 
between individual portfolios and on sector level.. But it is also possible there are other factors that lead 
to these inefficient outcomes, such as contractual obligations in the purchasing of gas that lead 
companies to make use of relatively expensive power plants.  
 
18.  Despite the lower markup in 2007, profits from generating electricity were still good. The average profit 
per MW was well above the amount necessary for investing in a new plant, which means that the current 
market outcomes prompt investments in new power plants. At this moment there are indeed many plans 
for the construction of new power plants. Once these plans are realised, the scarcity will decline and the 
market position of individual players will weaken, which will lead to more competition and possibly a 
lower electricity price. It is therefore important that factors which impede the construction of new power 
plants, such as the limited availability of transmission capacity, be removed (in as efficient a manner as 
possible) by the national (TenneT) and regional network operators.  
 
Market places 
19.  The liquidity of the APX spot market, the Dutch electricity market, developed favourably in 2007. The APX 
showed fewer price peaks and the sensitivity of the price to extra bids decreased. The trade volume rose, 
but not so much as in past years. In relation to the size of the national markets, volumes on APX were NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  10
high compared to Powernext (French market) and continue to lag somewhat behind the EEX (German 
market). Prices on the electricity markets follow each other reasonably closely, though there are 
sometimes major price differences, which are related to impediments to the use of the cross-border 
transport capacity.  
 
20.  In contrast to this, the liquidity of the markets for standardised forward contracts, both OTC and Endex, 
developed unfavourably in 2007, for reasons that are still unclear. The volumes (traded and cleared) on 
Endex clearly declined. On the OTC market the spread between bid and offer prices for monthly contracts 
was higher, although instances of extremely high spreads disappeared, and there were also more and 
higher price fluctuations. In the case of annual contracts the spread between bid and offer prices and the 
volatility of prices was comparable with 2006. In comparison to forward markets in neighbouring 
countries, the Netherlands had a clearly higher spread between bid and offer prices, while the volatility of 
the prices in the Netherlands was more in line with that in neighbouring countries.  
 
21.  The electricity market is impeded by imperfections in the gas market, but that is hardly the case the other 
way round. Improving the functioning of the gas market would therefore benefit the electricity market, 
while the electricity market can at the same time contribute positively to providing flexibility on the gas 
market.  
 
22.  Because of the limited availability of quality conversion, electricity producers were strongly dependent on 
a single supplier for L-gas. The availability of quality conversion however changed as of 1 July 2008 
because of agreements between GTS and GasTerra. Once this has also been officially set down in the gas 
codes, the availability of quality conversion may no longer pose a problem for gas customers. This 
integration however does not take away from the fact that the dependence on the largest supplier still 
exists in providing for the need for seasonal flexibility.  
 
23.  A major bottleneck is still the lack of liquid markets for flexibility and balancing. By adjusting the 
balancing regime and improving the steering information, which will enable parties to respond according 
to market prices, this will improve significantly. This adjustment should be realised as soon as possible. 
It is also very important that the development of the TTF be promoted by stipulating that all gas must be 
transferred on the TTF, whereby there will also be a broad range of products offered.  
 
24.  Further European integration of the national energy markets is a necessary condition for the further 
development of energy markets. Because of the interrelation of national networks, it is important that the 
national TSOs put together comprehensive plans for more efficient utilisation of existing infrastructure 
and the development of new infrastructure. Additionally it is essential that the conditions for (effective) 
independent network management are met in all countries. Finally, supervision on the energy markets 
will benefit from the arrival of a strong and independent European regulator, which will allow quicker and 
more effective action.  
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The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has the statutory duty of keeping a close eye on the wholesale 
markets for electricity and gas.
1 The aim of this monitoring is to determine whether competition in these 
markets is impeded and which measures the NMa and the Minister of Economic Affairs can take to remove 
these impediments. Because of the relationship between the electricity and gas markets, the similarities in 
the manner of analysing them, and the desire to achieve efficiency advantages in the monitoring, the analysis 
of the gas market and that of the electricity market have been combined in a single report this year.  
 
 
The monitoring of competition on the wholesale markets consists, roughly, of comparing observed 
developments with benchmarks. Three main aspects here are:  
  Access to and availability of infrastructure; 
  Degree of competition among players (among producers, buyers and traders);  
  Development of marketplaces. 
Access to essential infrastructure, such as the high voltage network, gas storage facilities and quality 
conversion stations, is the basic condition for the creation of competitive energy markets and the 
development of liquid marketplaces. Ideally the quality and quantity of the infrastructure should be such that 
any alteration (expansion or contraction) would lead to losses in welfare. The infrastructure must also, in 
principle, be accessible to all market parties under conditions that the investment costs will be compensated 
and that it leads to as efficient as possible decisions on the use of the infrastructure. Competitive markets are 
also characterised by a structure in which market parties are not able to exercise market power and prices are 
determined by the marginal costs of supply. Liquidity in marketplaces minimises transaction costs and 
inspires confidence in the market.  
 
In order to determine to what degree the actual market situation has achieved the ideal situation, we use 
various criteria, depending on the availability of data and/or the possibility of calculating these benchmarks.
2 
The criteria that we apply are:  
•  Development over time, both within the year itself and in comparison with the previous year;  
•  Situation in other countries, in particular countries with which the Netherlands has cross border  
connections, such as Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom; 
•  Deviation from critical values of specific key indicators, such as the RSI, markup and the degree of 
coverage of investments;
3 
                                                           
1 The Electricity Act 1998 (Section 5, subsection 3) states (translated): ‘The board of the competition authority 
in exercising the tasks and powers assigned to it on grounds of this act and the Gas Act takes into account 
the interest of promoting an electricity market and a gas market that are non-discriminatory and transparent 
and characterised by actual competition and effective market operation. It keeps a close eye on to what 
degree the electricity market and the gas market satisfy the [...] aforementioned interests [...].’ 
2 Theoretically the best criterion is one that gives information on the marginal welfare effects of measures 
aimed at improving competition: a market is still not adequately competitive as long as there are still 
measures that could be taken whose benefits outweigh the costs. The method of applying this criterion is to 
carry out social cost-benefit analyses of specific measures. For reasons of practicality we do not apply this 
method in this monitor, but the way of thinking of this method does contribute to the background of this 
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•  Generally accepted rules of thumb, such as the rule that a market is strongly concentrated if it has an 
HHI of more than 1,800.  
 
Based on the general starting points above, the monitoring of the wholesale markets consists of gathering 
and analysing data and information about infrastructure, competition and marketplaces. The aforementioned 
statutory basis gives the NMa the power to request the necessary data from the market parties. These data 
requests are partly compulsory; for the rest the participation of market parties in the information gathering 
takes place on a voluntary basis. In addition to requests to market parties, information is gathered from 
external sources as well, such as from Platts and TSO Auction (see table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Data gathered 
Section Target  group  Quantities 
Gas market  GTS  Available and utilised capacity per hour per type of 
infrastructure 
  Traders  Survey on views on liquidity of marketplaces and 
transparency in the market 
 Marketplaces  Prices  and  volumes 
Electricity market  TenneT  Available, obtained and nominated 
interconnection (cross border) capacity per hour; 
Available production capacity of power plants per 
hour  
  Producers  Production per power plant per hour; 
Characteristics of power plants 
  Others, including traders  Survey on views on liquidity of marketplaces and 
transparency in the market 
 Marketplaces  Prices  and  volumes 
 
Supplementary to the analysis of the data gathered, various meetings were held with market parties, both 
bilaterally and in a broader context in the form of feedback groups, workshops and presentations.  
 
The individual developments on the gas and electricity markets are reported in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship between the two markets. The key question there is to what degree the 
characteristics of the one market disturb the operation of the other market and what must happen to remove 
this disturbance. Chapter 5 focuses on the question of how the further integration of the European energy 
markets can be promoted. The appendices present more detailed (background) information.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 If the RSI (Residual Supply Index) is smaller than 1, a player has the possibility of influencing the market 
outcomes. If the markup is positive, that is a sign of (temporary) allocative inefficiency. If the degree of 





The wholesale market for gas is the market on which producers, traders and bulk consumers meet up to buy 
and sell natural gas. There are various marketplaces for this, including exchanges and OTC markets, both for 
short-term products and forward products. Section 2.4 analyses the liquidity of these marketplaces. The 
degree of competition between the suppliers of gas is the topic of section 2.3. This chapter starts with an 






•  At the start of 2006 the NMa set up a policy regulation for flexibility services. This regulation assigns 
GTS the task of offering shippers the opportunity to feed in more or less gas than they had booked in 
advance. In order to be able to offer this flexibility, GTS organises a tender in which GasTerra is 
required to bid because of the dominance in short-term flexibility. GTS sells this flexibility under the 
name ‘combiflex’.  
•  In July 2006 Gas Regional Initiative (GRI) was started for nine North West European countries. This 
regional consultation is aimed at accelerating the process of removing cross-border barriers.  
•  In October 2006 the Netherlands implemented European provisions on Third Party Access (TPA) in 
its energy legislation. One of these provisions stipulates that unused capacity that has in fact been 
booked must be once again made available to the market. Another stipulation requires that the 
network operators (GTS) make information on occupancy of the capacity accessible to everyone.  
•  In December 2006 the BBL gas pipeline was put into operation, which meant that the markets of the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom were now directly connected to each other. For the time being 
gas can only stream to the UK, but in the long term the BBL may become bi-directional.  
•  In July 2007 GTS started publishing updated information online on the available border capacity. The 
utilisation of various import and export points can now be followed online.  
•  In October 2007 the NMa published the research report ‘Versnelling van de ontwikkeling van TTF en 
de groothandelsmarkt voor gas ‘ [Acceleration of the development of TTF and the wholesale market for 
gas], containing ten recommendations for the Minister of Economic Affairs. 
•  In February 2008 network operators GTS and BEB (Germany) started a platform for booking day-ahead 
(interruptible) cross-border transport capacity.  
•  The Minister of Economic Affairs sent a letter to the Lower House of Parliament in February 2008 in 
which she announced various measures to improve the gas market. An amendment to the law should 
ensure that capacity that has been booked, but not used, becomes available for third parties more 
quickly. Another amendment to the law should promote the transfer of gas on the TTF. The Minister 
also said in the letter that she had ordered GTS to design a new balancing regime to make balancing 
easier and more efficient for shippers. Finally the minister announced changes to the gas codes 
scrapping the booking of quality conversion.  
•  In June 2008 GTS confirmed that, as soon as it is provided for in the codes, conversion capacity will 
no longer have to be booked.  
•  Energy exchanges APX (NL) and Trac-X (DE) started a pilot project in May 2008 for the secondary 
trade of day-ahead capacity on the border between Germany and the Netherlands.  
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The gas balance describes the origin and destination of gas flows. The supply of gas in the Netherlands 
comes from three sources: the Groningen field, the small fields, and import. The Groningen field is unique 
because of its natural properties, in particular its size and the pressure under which the gas is situated 
(which is decreasing over time). These characteristics make the Groningen field the largest supplier of flexible 
production in Western Europe. The Netherlands also has a large number of smaller gas fields, both onshore 
and offshore. The physical properties of these fields are such that, except during the startup and dismantling 
stage, a stable production level is the most profitable path of depletion. The third source of the gas supply is 
import from primarily Norway and Russia. In the long term gas will also be coming from the Middle East in 
the form of LNG. The total supply of gas is distinguished according to its energy density. In this monitor we 
observe a distinction between high calorific gas (H gas) and low calorific gas (L gas), which category includes 
the Groningen gas (or G gas).  
 
About 75% of the total supply of gas in the Netherlands comes from domestic production (see figure 2.1 and 
appendix 2). The share of import in the total supply increased by about 1 percentage point: from 24% to 25%. 
The total volume of gas transported in 2007 rose by 0.3% compared to 2006. The domestic gas production 
of low calorific gas (L gas) from the Groningen field was again lower in 2007 than in the previous year. This 
decline is related to the lower domestic consumption of this gas. The production of high calorific gas (H gas) 
from the small fields rose, while the gas import remained virtually the same. The sale of H gas on the 
domestic market decreased, while more was exported.  
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Infrastructure is necessary for the proper operation of the gas market. A limited availability of, or limited 
access to, infrastructure can result in obstacles to competition. In this monitor we make a distinction among 
five components of the Dutch gas infrastructure for which we analyse the possible impediments: production 




Because data on the physical hourly production capacity of the gas fields are not at hand, we define 
production capacity as the peak production in the 2006-2007 period. This assumption yields a production 
capacity of 121 GW for L gas and 58 GW for H gas
4.  
 
The degree of utilisation of the production capacity for L gas was 29% on average in 2007. That is somewhat 
lower than in 2006 (33%). The average utilisation of production capacity for H gas was 78% in 2007, 
somewhat higher than in 2006 (75%). The Groningen field has markedly greater flexibility than the small 
fields. The Groningen field’s production has a strongly seasonal pattern, in which production is closely 
connected with the outside temperature, especially in the winter period (see appendix 2). 
 


















Partly because of the mild winters in the 2006-2007 period, we can assume that the maximum production 
capacity was not achieved in 2007. From this we conclude that the (technical) availability and utilisation of 
the production capacity did not produce any bottlenecks for the market. It is the case that access to the 
production capacity is limited to a few players, which has consequences for competition, particularly in the 
case of L gas and the market for seasonal flexibility.  
                                                           
4 This is a conservative assumption of the production capacity actually available. Since it was not very cold in 
2006 and 2007, we can assume that there was still some space available even during the highest production. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  20
 
Because the cross-border trade in gas in particular is important for (realising) competition in the gas market, 
we concentrate here on possible impediments to import and export capacity. We look here on an aggregate 
level at the available import and export capacity. The availability and utilisation of capacity per import and 
export point is described in more detail in the transport monitor that GTS published in July.
5 
 
The Netherlands imports H gas from Germany (Emden-Oude Statenzijl) and Belgium (Zelzate). The total 
technical import capacity in 2007 was just over 30,000 MW.
6 It has emerged that the firm (fixed) import 
capacity was fully booked in 2007, just as in 2006. The capacity is also fully booked for the coming years. This 
creates a limitation for market parties since they can no longer book any firm import capacity. It also became 
clear from the shippers’ survey that market parties see the limited availability of transport capacity as a 
reasonably high to high barrier to their activities on the Dutch wholesale market (see also section 2.3).  
 
On average 86% of the total import capacity was utilised in 2007. This is an increase of 10 percentage points 
compared to the 76% percent utilisation rate in 2006. Impediments to efficient market functioning can occur 
at times when import capacity is being fully utilised (or is unavailable). The analysis indicates that the import 
capacity in the Emden-Oude Statenzijl cluster was fully utilised during 199 hours in 2007. In 2006 that was 7 
hours. The import capacity at Zelzate was not fully utilised during any hour in 2007, and therefore it did not 
occur that both import clusters were simultaneously fully utilised for H gas.  
 
7 
GTS accepts bookings of capacity on a ‘First come, first served’ basis. As long as the allocated capacity does 
not exceed technical capacity, firm bookings are made. Since it often turns out in practice that shippers take 
less than booked, as they usually contract their peak demand, GTS can continue to accept bookings. 
Bookings above the technical capacity are then agreed on an interruptible basis. Interruptible capacity is 
cheaper than firm capacity, but entails the risk that the capacity cannot be allocated. Interruptible capacity 
therefore involves more uncertainty for shippers, as the ultimate availability depends on all sorts of uncertain 
factors (such as weather conditions) that determine gas transport.  
 
                                                           
5 Gas transport services, Transport Insight 2008. 
6 Note that the import capacity determined by GTS is not a fixed technical fact, but depends on the utilisation 
of the domestic transport network.  
7 The definitions used in this monitor for the various forms of capacity and the utilisation thereof are based 
on those used by the TSO. For the calculation of utilisation we assume that the firm capacity is equal to the 
technical capacity, which is a conservative assumption. In the unlinked entry/exit system the origin or 
destination of booked exit and entry cannot be determined. In order to be able to accommodate the 
uncertainty that this creates, GTS reserves capacity. The technical capacity is consequently higher in actuality 
than the capacity that is offered as firm. This can be the reason why utilisation comes to higher than 100%.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  21




















The full booking in combination with the under-utilisation and the existence of price differences on the day-
ahead markets point to inefficient utilisation. In periods during which the price on the TTF spot market was 
higher than on the spot markets of Zeebrugge and BEB, the import capacity was not fully utilised (see figure 
2.6).
8 This means that the import capacity is not being efficiently utilised, which is due both to the 
unavailability of unused capacity (because of the full booking) and the lack of short-term capacity.  
 
Figure 2.6 Price difference day-ahead between TTF and BEB in relation to the utilisation rate of the import 


















                                                           
8 Statistical analysis shows that the utilisation of both import and export capacity is closely related to price 
differences. About 25% of the variation in the utilisation of import capacity can be explained by the height of 
price differences between the spot markets; for export capacity that figure is about 15%. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  22
 
There are two types of networks for the transport of gas: GTS’s high pressure network and the regional 
distribution companies’ low pressure network. The high pressure network consists in turn of separate 
networks of pipelines for various types of gas, including high calorific gas and Groningen gas (see figure 2.5). 
The entry points of the high pressure network consist of production points, gas storage facilities and import 
points. An exit point can be an export point, gas storage installation or a gas receipt station. These entry and 
exit points are also actual physical points. In addition to these physical entry and exit points, there is also the 
administrative entry and exit point of the TTF (Title Transfer Facility), a virtual marketplace. Nothing 
physically happens at the TTF, but the shippers must report their TTF transaction for transport to GTS; that is 
why the TTF may also be mentioned on lists of entry and exit points. From the GOS (Gas receipt station) the 
gas is transported via the regional network operator’s regional network to the end consumer’s meter. A 
number of large companies are connected directly to GTS’s national network via their own GOS.  
 
 




























(source: 2006 Annual Report, GTS) 
 NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  23
The unavailability of capacity that does physically exist leads to the failure to utilise price differences. This loss 
can amount to roughly several tens of millions of euros per year.
9 This is the extra amount that Dutch gas 
consumers must pay because not all the present import capacity can be utilised. This loss can be prevented 
without additional investments, specifically by making the capacity that is already physically available more 
accessible.  
 
It is therefore very important that GTS make more import capacity available, particularly for the short term. In 
the first place the existing capacity would be able to be better utilised. Because of the first come, first served 
mechanism current import capacity is primarily in the hands of incumbents: parties that have been active on 
the gas market for a long time and who have no incentive to make more intensive use of the capacity. For the 
long term, new parties on the market barely get a chance to book firm capacity. Market parties do not see 
interruptible capacity, which is often still available for booking, as a good alternative (see also section 2.3). 
What also plays a role in the short term is that there is still insufficient transparency about the available 
capacity. As a result, capacity can remain unutilised, even in situations in which it would be logical to utilise 
this because of price differences.  
 
More efficiency can be achieved on the import connections by improving allocation. The aim of 
improvements must be to better redistribute unused transport capacity in a manner in line with the market. 
In the past it turned out that use-it-or-lose-it clauses are not efficient enough (ERGEG, 2007). That is why, 
also in the European context, much is expected of initiatives for promoting secondary trade in capacity. In 
2008 a pilot project was started with the day-ahead sale of firm capacity at the Bunde-Oude Statenzijl border 
point via APX and Trac-X. Network operators GTS and BEB started a trial with the day-ahead sale of 
interruptible capacity under the name Eucabo (European Capacity Booking). In the gas letter to Parliament of 
February 2008 the Minister of Economic Affairs announced that the regulations necessary to further facilitate 
these initiatives were in preparation.  
 
In addition, GTS will have to build new import capacity. Not only capacity that can be booked for the longer 
term, but precisely capacity that can be made available in the short term. GTS does hold so-called open 
season procedures, in which the network operator gauges how much demand there is for transport capacity 
before taking an investment decision, but this only concerns capacity for the long term. In doing so GTS 
gives shippers the risk of the investments, who are asked to commit for several years. Shippers indicate that 
they have problems with this (see also section 2.3.2). GTS should itself take on more risk and build and 
reserve capacity for the short term.  
 
H gas is exported to Germany, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The export connection with the United 
Kingdom (BBL connection) is left out of consideration in this analysis because tests have rendered the data 
insufficiently reliable. The export capacity of H gas to Germany and Belgium is in total about 20,000 MW. 
The analysis indicates that on average 89% of this capacity was booked in 2007 (see figure 2.7). The bookings 
have increased compared to 2006, but there is still not a case of full booking for the total of the export 
points. For a few export connections individually there was sometimes a case of full booking.  
 
 
                                                           
9 The extra expenditure for gas consumers because of the inability to purchase lower priced gas on a foreign 
spot market (while the infrastructure does still have room) is determined as follows. On the German-Dutch 
border, during 18.8% of the hours that the price on the German market (BEB) was at least  0.50 lower than 
on the TTF, an average of 7151 MWh/h was unutilised, with an average price difference* of 1.22 EUR/MWh, 
which comes to about 14 million euros in extra expenditure.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  24



















The utilisation rate also increased: from an average of 41% in 2006 to 48% in 2007. It must be noted here 
that the increase in the booking and utilisation rate was probably caused by a limitation on the available 
capacity; the nominal quantities were lower in 2007 than in 2006. 
 
In 2007 it did not occur that all export clusters for H gas were fully utilised at the same time. Individual 
export points were fully utilised, and more often fully utilised than in 2006. The hour of full utilisation was 
simultaneous only at the Zuid-Limburg and Vlieghuis clusters (see table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1 Simultaneous utilisation of Vlieghuis and Zuid-Limburg 
Number of hours of utilisation  Zuid-Limburg underutilised  Zuid-Limburg fully utilised 
Vlieghuis underutilised  8242  62 
Vlieghuis fully utilised  310  146 
 
L gas is exported to Belgium and Germany via various export points. On average 89% of the total capacity 
was booked. The average utilisation of the capacity in 2007 was 37%, comparable therefore to 2006. Just as 
for H gas, there was never a case of full utilisation of the export points for L gas in 2007 either (see figure 
2.8).  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  25
 



















The export capacity of neither H gas nor L gas was fully booked in 2007, nor fully utilised. This means that 
export capacity was available at all times, and there were no physical impediments for the market. This does 
not mean, for the rest, that market parties could utilise the infrastructure to arbitrate away short-term price 
difference between countries. Because short-term capacity was not adequately at hand, the utilisation of the 
export capacity was less than could be expected on the basis of price differences between marketplaces.  
 
 
The low calorific gas (L gas) is further categorised on the basis of energy density as either L gas, G+ gas or G 
gas (see also appendix 2). The categorisation into four gas qualities (the 3 types of low calorific gas 
mentioned plus H gas) is important in monitoring quality conversion. Of the four gas types, L gas and G+ 
gas must be made via quality conversion. This quality conversion takes place via one of these methods: by 
mixing the H gas and G gas together, or by thinning out H gas with nitrogen (nitrogen fixation).  
 
In 2007 GTS made 33 million quality conversion units (KCE) available to the market.
10 Of this capacity 
offered, about 29.5 million KCE originated from nitrogen fixation, and about 3.5 million KCE from mixing.  
                                                           
10 A quality conversion unit (KCE) is equal to lowering the Wobbe index of one m3 of gas by one step. If the 33 
million KCE is used to lower the Wobbe index of H gas five steps in order to get L gas, then 63 GWh L gas 
consequently becomes available. To compare: the total exit of L gas (domestically and in export) was on 
average about 70 GWh, with a maximum of 168 GWh, in 2007. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  26
 
A shipper must contract quality conversion if the Wobbe index (a measure of energy content) is on average 
lower on the exit side than the Wobbe index on the entry side.  
Quality conversion takes place by mixing H gas with L gas or by adding nitrogen to H gas. It is not possible 
to convert L gas into H gas, G+ gas or G gas. GTS has mixing stations and nitrogen injection stations at a 
number of locations on the high pressure network (see figure 2.10).  
Gas can also be converted to a different quality in a virtual manner, namely via swaps. This means that a 
company that has H gas trades this (plus any compensation) with a company that has L gas. This virtual 
conversion can also take place in a trade of L gas for H gas.  
 
It follows from the analysis of the utilisation
11 that the 33 million KCE was not fully utilised during any hour in 
2007 (see figure 2.9). The use of nitrogen was fully deployed, but this was only during 5 hours.  
 



















The total conversion capacity offered was fully booked in 2007. This capacity is also fully booked for the 
coming years. Market parties encountered a great deal of nuisance from this limitation, as became clear from 
the shippers’ survey. This was caused by the allocation system in which the conversion capacity is booked on 
the basis of ‘first come, first served’. The NMa already reached this conclusion in the so-called TTF 
recommendation (NMa, 2007). GTS and GasTerra have in the meantime made contractual agreements 
whereby GTS has full control over the use of quality conversion and shippers no longer have to book 
conversion capacity. As of 1 January 2010 this will also be set down in the codes, but from 1 July 2008 the 
bottleneck is already de facto removed.
12 
                                                           
11 We calculated the utilisation on the basis of data on the hourly entry and exit and quantities of nitrogen 
used. A theoretical hourly demand for quality conversion can be derived from this (see figure 2.9). The 
calculation method followed uses the average Wobbe index however, while per exit point the energy density 
can differ from this average within a bandwidth. This calculation model can deviate from the KCEs actually 
used (see also appendix 2).  
12 Be it that there are costs associated with the quality conversion.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  27
 
Flexibility 
The supply of gas is generally level, but many end users do not need a constant flow of gas, and instead use gas 
according to a pattern that varies over time. When demand varies per season, for households and market 
gardeners for instance, seasonal flexibility is needed. Seasonal flexibility can be provided by the Groningen field 
and the gas storage installations in Alkmaar, Norg and Grijpskerk. Gas storage facilities with a short response 
time, such as LNG installations, can be used for short-term flexibility. Portfolio effects, tolerance in the network 
and demand response can also provide short-term flexibility. The demand for flexibility can be estimated using 
the gas balance. Below it emerges that especially the domestic consumption of L gas has a great need for 












Flexibility is partly provided by gas storage facilities. In order to be better able to indicate the use of gas storage, 
we can, in the same manner in which the demand for flexibility was estimated, give an idea of the distribution 
among different types of flexibility that the gas storage facilities provide. The figure shows that gas storage 
















The maximum flexibility is defined as follows:  
Maximum hour-flex:   Greatest difference in hourly take-up between consecutive hours.  
Maximum day-flex:   Greatest difference in average hourly take-up between consecutive days.  
Maximum week-flex:   Greatest difference in average hourly take-up between consecutive weeks. 
Maximum month-flex  Greatest difference in average hourly take-up between consecutive months.  
Maximum season-flex:   Greatest difference in average hourly take-up per month between different not 
necessarily consecutive, months.  
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Storage capacity is a collective term for the three dimensions that characterise gas storage facilities: 
extraction capacity (send-out capacity), injection capacity and working volume. Extraction capacity is the 
maximum capacity with which a storage facility can feed gas into the gas network, injection capacity is the 
maximum capacity with which gas can be taken from the system, and working volume is the total volume 
that is available for injection and extraction. There are four types of gas storage for the Dutch market: 
(depleted) gas fields (Grijpskerk, Norg and Alkmaar), salt caves (Epe and, in future, Zuidwending), aquifers 
(in Kalle, Germany) and LNG installations (Maasvlakte). Storage of gas is an important means of providing 
for the need for flexibility (see text inset). 
 
H gas market 
Two storage facilities for H gas are connected to GTS’s network. The most important is the storage 
installation in Grijpskerk. This storage facility has a work volume of 14.65 TWh and a send-out capacity of 
22.4 GW. 11% of this capacity is made available to the market. The remaining storage capacity is used by 
operator NAM itself and used as injection storage for the Small Fields Policy and retention of the flexibility of 
the Groningen field. The other storage installation is in Kalle (Germany). This storage facility, with a work 
volume of 2.5 TWh and a send-out capacity of 4.6 GW, is used entirely by operator RWE itself for flexibility on 
the Dutch market. There are no separate data known about the storage facility in Kalle with regard to 
utilisation. This storage facility was therefore left outside consideration. For determination of the utilisation 
we regard the technical capacity of Grijpskerk as the available capacity, and we make use of data from GTS.  
 
The utilisation of the extraction capacity of Grijpskerk was 9% on average in 2007. On average 25% of the 
total injection capacity was utilised in 2007. At no time was this storage fully utilised.  
 
L gas market 
Just like the storage in Grijpskerk the NAM regards the storage facilities in the former gas fields of Norg and 
Alkmaar as part of the Dutch gas production. None of the storage capacity of Norg is made available to the 
market, 7% of Alkmaar’s is made available to the market. Essent and Nuon use their storage capacity in Epe 
(Germany) entirely for their own purposes, and do not make it available to the market. Gasunie’s LNG 
installation is used for peak delivery, and is in principle reserved for security of supply on extremely cold days.  
The utilisation of the extraction capacity of all storage facilities for L gas was on average 5% in 2007.
13 This is 
somewhat more than in 2006, when a utilisation rate of 2% was achieved. On average 17% of the injection 
capacity was utilised in 2007. That too is more than in 2006. It concerns mainly the peak utilisation because 
of the role of gas storage facilities in supplying flexibility. Figure 2.12 shows that maximum utilisation of the 
extraction capacity of the storage of L gas is approximately half of the total capacity. In by far the most hours 
of the year the utilisation is markedly lower. 
 
It is clear that the availability of seasonal storage capacity for the market (that is: other parties than the 
current contractor) is extremely limited. Of the total storage capacity only 4% is made available to the market. 
For market parties, in particular for new entrants to the market, this limited availability can pose a problem. 
Because of the limited access market parties are dependent on GasTerra for their seasonal flexibility. 
Shippers see the limited availability of gas storage as a barrier to competition on the gas market (see section 
2.3).  
                                                           
13 We regard the joint technical capacity as the available capacity. The utilisation is the sum of the utilisation 
of all storage facilities together.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  29
 
 



















The graph also shows that the existing storage capacity has a low utilisation rate. A large part of the send-out 
capacity and the work volume is currently reserved for production support in extremely cold periods (security 
of supply) and for support of the Small Fields Policy. In 2007 however this reservation was barely used. The 
logical question therefore is whether more capacity of these gas storage facilities can be made available to the 
market. The development of the gas market makes this question all the more important. A liquid marketplace 
and a balancing regime in line with the market will, after all, ensure that in extreme situations customers 
respond to market developments with their demand. This demand response ensures security of supply, 
which means that the need for a permanent reservation of the gas storage facilities for the sake of security of 
supply decreases.  
 
Whether the existing storage capacity is made available or not has an effect on investments in new gas 
storage facilities. The advantage of greater availability of seasonal storage using the existing storage is that 
inefficient investments in (more expensive) storage facilities can be avoided. The risk of ambiguity about the 
availability is however that it impedes (necessary) investments in new gas storage facilities. The possibility 
that in future more existing capacity will become available presumably has an impact on (the phasing of) 
investment decisions. It is therefore essential that clarity be provided soon on the use of these gas storage 
facilities.  
 
When the gas transport network is not fully burdened, the extra room in the gas network can be used as a 
buffer.
14 With outside temperatures higher than 0°C GTS has 14 million m
3 net in buffer capacity. Because 
take-up is not simultaneous, GTS however counts on a gross value of 21 million m
3 in buffer capacity. With 
this buffer space in the network shippers can cushion a part of their imbalance (the hourly difference between 
entry and exit). Each shipper is given a part of this buffer capacity as a tolerance on the hourly imbalance. The 
buffer capacity results in a bandwidth within which a shipper may be imbalanced, without incurring financial 
                                                           
14 At higher temperatures the (booked) transport capacity is used less, consequently GTS can use this 
unutilised (but already purchased) space as buffer capacity.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  30
consequences. Only once the imbalance is greater than the tolerance latitude is the shipper fined for his 
imbalance.  
 
The size of the tolerance space depends on the shipper’s portfolio. In the current balancing regime, it is the 
case that a shipper with a smaller portfolio has more of a chance of becoming imbalanced than a shipper 
with a larger portfolio. The small portfolios are therefore granted relatively more tolerance than larger 
portfolios.  
 
Figure 2.11 Average hourly residue


















We do not have sufficient data to be able to make pronouncements on the maximum utilisation of the buffer 
capacity. It has since been included in the gas codes that GTS must make information about the buffer space 
in the network available on an hourly basis. This so-called linepack-monitor is not yet available to date. GTS is 
expected to introduce this monitor together with the new balancing regime. This is expected to happen on 1 
January 2010.  
 
On the basis of the hourly values for entry and exit, we can get an idea of the average utilisation of the buffer 
capacity. The average hourly residue (that is, the difference between total entry and total exit) of the gas 
balance shows that in the evening and early morning hours more gas is put into the system to accommodate 
the peak usage in the morning (see figure 2.13). During the year the utilisation of the buffer capacity varies 
depending on the space that the transport network offers.  
 
                                                           




We make use of two indicators in evaluating the concentration in the gas market: the HHI index and the C3.
16 
These indicators are determined for the various segments of the gas value chain (see also appendix 2), and 
enable us to make pronouncements on the degree of market concentration.  
 











The analysis indicates that the concentration was still high in 2007 for virtually all segments of the Dutch 
wholesale market. Looked at as a whole, the picture has hardly changed since 2006.  
 
The high concentration in the L gas market (see figure 2.15) is largely explained by the historical position of 
NAM and GasTerra. The market for production of L gas is virtually a monopoly since NAM has the sole right 
to the production of the Groningen field. Domestic entry and exit, and import and export, are also highly 
concentrated. This is caused by the position that supplier GasTerra occupies in all these segments of the 
market. As a result virtually all the natural gas produced in the Netherlands is put on the market by 
GasTerra.
17 The most conspicuous difference compared to 2006 is the decrease in concentration in the 
import of L gas. This cannot lead to any conclusions however. The volume of imported L gas is so limited 
that slight shifts can lead to these kinds of results.  
 
                                                           
16 The HHI expresses the sum of the squared market shares in a market. The HHI can be a value between 0 
and 10,000, whereby 10,000 corresponds to a monopolised market. If the HHI is above 1,800, then a market 
is usually regarded to be strongly concentrated. An HHI between 1,200 and 1,800 is a ‘moderately 
concentrated’ market. The C3 is calculated by adding up the market shares of the three largest market parties.  
17 On grounds of the Small Fields Policy, GasTerra is required to purchase all the gas that producers of small 
fields offer. Although these producers may also sell the gas to other parties, it emerges in practice that the 
lion’s share is sold to GasTerra.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  32
















In comparison to the L gas market, the H gas market is less concentrated, although the concentration there 
can still be called high (see figure 2.16). It is clear that many more players are active in this segment. The high 
concentration in domestic entry can once again be explained by the position of GasTerra, which, as part of 
the Small Fields Policy, brings virtually all the H gas produced in the Netherlands onto the market.  
 
There are some noticeable changes compared to 2006. The concentration in the import of H gas has 
decreased by more than 16% compared to 2006. The decrease in domestic exit of H gas is even greater: no 
less than 46%. It can be concluded from this that the competition on the domestic H gas market is 
increasing significantly.  
 
















Improvements can also be seen in the trade on TTF and in quality conversion (see figure 2.17). In 2006 the 
HHI of the TTF trade was 1,505.
18 In 2007 that value dropped to under 1,000, which is an indication that the 
trade on TTF is not concentrated, but also that the largest (potential) supplier is only active to a limited 
degree on the TTF.  
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In the section on infrastructure, various obstacles to entering the wholesale market for gas were noted, such 
as a lack of firm import capacity, quality conversion capacity and storage capacity. In a survey shippers were 
asked their opinion on quantifying possible barriers in the gas market.  
 
The shippers’ survey indicated that the scarcity of transport capacity in particular is seen as a major obstacle 
to entering the market (see figure 2.18). Here what is concerned mainly is the lack of firm import capacity. 
Because they are unable to get any firm import capacity, shippers indicate that they cannot operate on the 
Dutch market. Most shippers do not find interruptible capacity, which is often available, as a good alternative 
because of the risk of interruption and with it the related price risk of imbalance. Interruptible capacity can 
only be a good alternative if the price risk is lowered. That can be achieved either via more up-to-date 
balancing information about the interruption chances or if the costs of imbalance are drastically reduced, for 
example with a properly functioning imbalance market.  
 
Shippers also see the lack of storage capacity, conversion capacity and flexibility as reasonably major 
obstacles. The shortage of flexibility means makes it difficult for many shippers to operate on the Dutch 
market. The shortage of commercial flexibility reduces the liquidity on the market, say various shippers, and 
with it the number of trading parties. One shipper states that it is difficult to assess the value of flexibility 
services that are available because of the lack of information on the actual costs of imbalance.  
 
The answers on transparency and the information provision in the gas market also indicate that there is 
much room for improvement in this area. This emerges from the opinions on the availability of reliable 
information in the market (see figure 2.19). A lack of timely information turns out to still play a major role on 
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Just as last year, the quality and timeliness of balancing information (up-to-date information for managing 
imbalance) was deemed on average to be poor. In comparison to 2006 the shippers were even more negative 
on this point. Many shippers expressed criticism of the imbalance regime in their responses. Hourly 
balancing in combination with the lack of balancing information is, considering the height of the fines, a 
major obstacle for many new entrants on the market. In addition to the harsh criticism of the availability of 
information, the progress that GTS has made in this area was mentioned. In July 2007 GTS made more 
information available online. The Nimbus system, in which GTS makes real-time measuring data available, is 
seen as positive.  
 
With regard to information about transport capacity, criticism is levelled at the so called ‘minus 3 rule’
19. 
According to one shipper this rule poses a significant trade barrier. Because of the high concentration on the 
Dutch gas market the minus 3 rule applies for a great number of border connections. That makes the gas 
market non-transparent.  
 
The opinions on the information provision and price transparency in the OTC market, the bilateral market 
and on the energy exchanges APX and Endex were positive. It is clear however that the OTC market is well 
ahead of the other markets. The day-ahead market on APX made a significant leap forward and is regarded by 
more shippers as good.  
 
                                                           
19 The ‘minus 3 rule’ stems from Directive 1775/2005. Pursuant to article 6, paragraph 5 the operator of the 
national gas transport network can ask permission from the NMa to limit the mandatory publication of 
numerical information on technical, contracted and available capacity at an entry or exit point. If there are 
three or more shippers at that point, permission is not granted. Permission is possible however if there are 
one or two shippers.  
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Shippers also reported that they were satisfied with the GTS’s intentions to expand capacity. A number of 
shippers did level harsh criticism on the open season procedures with which the GTS gauges whether there is 
need for new transport capacity. Shippers say that the multi-year obligations which they must enter into and 
the limited promises that GTS provides in return are disproportionate. Moreover there is no coordination 
with neighbouring network operators. Shippers are asked to commit to a certain capacity without knowing 
whether they could also get this capacity across the border. One shipper stated explicitly that this prompted 





The majority of the gas that is sold in the Netherlands (92% in 2007) is delivered directly on the GOS by the 
wholesaler. This gas is therefore not traded, but only sold and delivered (under contract). The terms and 
conditions under which this gas is sold are (by definition) not transparent. The trade in the remaining 8% of 
the gas takes place on the TTF (Title Transfer Facility), a virtual marketplace on the high pressure network, 
where especially H gas is traded in long-term contracts via brokers.
20 
                                                           
20 The Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is not, as is sometimes thought, a spot market for gas, but a trading 
platform where gas is traded in various ways, and especially via brokers in contracts for the longer term. 
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The volumes traded on the central market TTF (Title Transfer Facility) rose in 2007 (see figure 2.21). 44% 
more gas was traded on the TTF than in 2006, while the volume supplied rose by 26%. The share of the trade 
on TTF in the total gas market also rose. In 2007 almost 8% of the gas present on the Dutch market was 
supplied on TTF, compared to 6.3% in 2006. Shippers see this as a positive development, according to the 
survey. Shippers see improvement to the trade volumes and the number of trading parties for both short-
term products and the longer term products (see appendix 2). 
 
The growth of the volume on the TTF was lower in 2007 than in previous years (see figure 2.22). It follows 
from this that in the past years up to and including 2007 there was stagnating growth. In the first half of 2008 
growth strongly increased once again however. The growth was probably caused by the fact that GasTerra 
started supplying more gas on TTF starting in 2008
21. Whether this has broken the trend of stagnating growth 
will not be clear until the end of 2008.  
 
One point for concern is the variation in products that are being traded on TTF. The share of L gas on the 
TTF remains extremely low in comparison to H gas. Just as in 2006 about 98% of the trade volume on TTF in 
2007 was in H gas. The majority of the gas on TTF is traded via the OTC market (80%) and bilateral 
agreements (18%). Market parties still use the gas exchanges APX and Endex primarily for portfolio 
optimisation, which means that volume remains limited.  
 
                                                           
21 See the press release ‘Aardgas tegen TTF-spotmarktindexatie’ [Natural gas at TTF spot market indexation], 
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Figure 2.19 Volumes traded and supplied on the TTF per month for 2005 through June 2008 
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The degree to which the TTF is used for the short term also says something about the important place the 
marketplace occupies on the gas market. The more market parties that trade in short-term products, the 
more they trust the gas market for their short-term interests and their balancing. The quantity of within-day 
trade (the ‘shortest’ product) has barely improved over the past year however. The so-called curve products 
(months to several years in advance) still dominate trade on the TTF. That picture also comes to the fore in 
the shippers’ survey (see appendix 2). The shippers say they do not have enough balancing information to be 
able to use within-day trade for their balancing. The liquidity development of within-day products also 
therefore continues to lag behind the development of day and week ahead supply (prompt) and month-ahead 
supply or longer (curve) on all fronts.  
 
 
Indicators for the liquidity in a market include the spread between bid and offer prices, depth in the market, 
resilience and volatility (price fluctuations). The analysis of the day-ahead and year-ahead contracts on the 
OTC markets indicates that the bid/offer spread
22 once again declined in 2007 compared to 2006 (see figure 
2.22). 
 







                                                           
22 The lower the spread, the easier traders can find a counterparty, and therefore the better matched the 
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Volatility is a measure to express price fluctuations. In the financial world volatility is usually used in the area 
of risk management. In general, the greater the volatility, the greater the uncertainty with regard to the price. 
The volatility therefore says something about the price risk on the market. The volatility of day-ahead and 
year-ahead contracts has declined in the past three years (see figure 2.23). This is positive for the 
development of the market. The volatility of the same products on the NBP and Zeebrugge proves to be 
higher than on the TTF. An explanation for this might be that because of the oil price linking in the 
Netherlands, there is less gas-to-gas competition than in the other markets.  
 
The depth of the market can be measured from the number of days/months/years in advance that shippers 
want to trade a product. The further in advance that parties trade a product, the less dependent they are on 
bilateral contracts for a diversified portfolio. It emerges from the shippers’ survey that the depth of the 
market has changed little compared to 2006 (see appendix 2). For the individual days and for monthly 
contracts the depth of the market seems to have declined somewhat. The depth of the summer/winter 
contract has increased. In contrast to this the TTF is still not a reliable source for gas and flexibility because 
of the limited number of products that are traded and the uncertainty of whether products will actually be 
available. 
 
The resilience is determined by the quantity of gas that shippers can trade without influencing the market 
price. Here too there have been few major changes (see appendix 2). For a number of contracts, such as the 
quarter and monthly contracts, the resilience seems to have decreased in 2007 compared to 2006, which 
means that the function of TTF as a price signal for these contracts has diminished slightly.
23 In contrast to 
this, a significant improvement can be seen in the weekend contract.  
 
Shippers are in general positive about the development of the liquidity of TTF. The shippers’ survey indicates 
that they see improvements for both the short-term and long-term products in, among other things, volumes 
and number of trading parties (see appendix 2). Nonetheless the evaluation of the liquidity of TTF compared 
to the neighbouring marketplaces shows little change (see figure 2.25). The British NBP always comes out as 
the most liquid marketplace for within-day, prompt and curve products. TTF comes in second for prompt and 
curve products. According to the shippers, Zeebrugge is somewhat better for within-day trade.  
 












                                                           
23 It must be noted here that the manner of formulating questions in the shippers’ survey differed from the 
formulation in the previous year. Therefore the conclusion is cautiously worded.  
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In summary the analysis above presents the picture that the Dutch marketplace TTF is developing, but that 
growth is stagnating. This stagnation is expected to come to an end from 1 January 2010. In the gas letter to 
Parliament dated 18 February the Minister of Economic Affairs announced an amendment to the law which 
will scrap the possibility of transferring gas at the regional Gas receipt stations (GOS). The gas on the 
domestic market will be transferred on the TTF from that time forward, where it can be re-traded or supplied 
directly to the customer. The Minister based the plans in the gas letter on the TTF recommendation that the 
NMa published in September 2007 (see box). If the announced amendment to the law is actually adopted, 




In September 2007 the NMa published the research report ‘Versnelling van de ontwikkeling van TTF en 
de groothandelsmarkt voor gas’ [Acceleration of the development of TTF and the wholesale market for 
gas]. This report, which served as advice to the Minister of Economic Affairs, identified a number of 
bottlenecks that were impeding the development of the gas market. It became clear from the report that 
there is much room for improvement, especially on the low calorific market.  
Partly in the interest of strengthening the position of the Netherlands as international gas roundabout, 
the NMa advises the minister to quickly proceed to the following concrete actions.  
1.  Scrap the booking of quality conversion, so that the partial markets of high and low calorific gas 
are no longer separated.  
2.  Improve the investment climate for (seasonal) flexibility.  
3.  Stipulate that gas be transferred on TTF, and no longer at the Gas receipt stations.  
4.  Create more standard master contracts for low calorific gas which will increase the tradability of 
gas on the TTF.  
5.  Introduce dispute settlement between GasTerra and its clients, provided that and as long as 
GasTerra is dominant. 
6.  Improve the balancing regime and the availability of balancing information so that balancing 
becomes easier for shippers.  
7.  Improve transparency on the available infrastructure, especially import and export capacity.  
8.  Reduce the existing credit risks associated with imbalance.  
9.  Harmonise the transport procedures in North West Europe.  
10.  Make space for secondary trade in short-term import and export capacity.  
 
Actions are also needed for the longer term, in particular to make investments in quality conversion, 
pipelines and LNG possible. The report also advises that the pipelines to Belgium (Zelzate) and the 




The wholesale market for electricity is the market on which producers, traders and bulk consumers meet up 
in order to buy and sell electricity. There are various marketplaces for this, including exchanges and OTC 
markets, both for spot and forward products. Section 3.4 analyses the liquidity of these marketplaces. 
Competition between the suppliers of electricity is the subject of section 3.3. This chapter starts with the 
analysis of the basic conditions for competition on the electricity market: the availability of infrastructure 
(section 3.2).  
 
•  Since 21 November 2006 trade on the electricity markets APX, Belpex and Powernext is connected, 
taking into account the available capacity on the various borders (market coupling with Belgium and 
France).  
•  In addition to the day-ahead market the APX started with an intra day market in September 2006. On 
this market quarter hours of electricity are traded up to two hours before delivery.  
•  Starting in October 2006, production data has been published, at the initiative of EnergieNed and APX. 
Initially only on the APX site, as of June 2007 on the EnergieNed website since the quality of the data is 
still insufficient.  
•  At the beginning of 2007 the regulators of the energy markets in Germany, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands published an overview with priorities and formulated concrete actions 
(action plan). Market coupling with Germany and cross-border intra day and balancing trade are a few of 
the action points of this Regional Initiative.  
•  The European Commission published a directive for congestion management as a part of Directive 
1228/2003, including instructions for awarding capacity to benefit the trade and transparency of cross-
border connections.  
•  Electricity production originating from wind parks in North Germany are increasingly creating transit 
flows (so-called loop flows). TSOs are seeing themselves forced to hold onto more reserves on the 
interconnectors, which limits available import capacity for the market.  
•  In May 2008 the NorNed cable, a high voltage connection between Norway and the Netherlands, was 
put into operation. Because of the great price differences between these two countries, especially during 
peak hours, there is a case of high utilisation of the capacity with auction prices of sometimes more than 
100 Euro/MWh. 
•  The investment plans of electricity producers show that there is limited capacity available on the high 
voltage network for connecting new power plants. In order to accommodate the temporary shortage of 
network capacity (until the completion of Randstad 380) TenneT is working on a system for congestion 





Competition on the wholesale market for electricity is highly dependent on the possibilities for transporting 
electricity. There are virtually no domestic restrictions on transport (thus far), but the border connections are 
traditionally pressing, especially at peak hours. Cross-border trade is very important for competition on the 
domestic market. Import of electricity can discipline players on the Dutch wholesale market and moreover 
creates more liquidity at the Dutch marketplaces. Cross-border trade can also lead to more efficient electricity 
generation when the generation costs in the various countries vary (at a certain time).  
 
To gain insight on the degree to which the cross-border connections pose restrictions for cross-border trade, 
we analyse in this section the utilisation rate of these connections and the degree of congestion at the Dutch 
borders. Data on available, obtained and nominated border capacity form the basis for this analysis.  
 
The utilisation of the border capacity with Germany yields a reasonably stable picture (see figure 3.1). The 
available import capacity is fully obtained by market players and most of it is utilised. Most of the available 
export capacity is also obtained, but this is only utilised to an extremely limited degree.  
 
Figure 3.1 Interconnection capacity the Netherlands – Germany (monthly average MW, 2007) 
 
 
The utilisation of the border capacity with Belgium varies considerably throughout the year (see figure 3.2). 
During the first six months import capacity is nominated to an increasing degree (and export capacity to a 
lesser degree), in the second six months this reverses and the Netherlands becomes a net exporter to 
Belgium in the last quarter.  
 
                                                           
24 The definitions used in this monitor for the different types of capacity and the utilisation thereof are based 
on those used by the TSO.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  43
Figure 3.2 Interconnection capacity the Netherlands – Belgium (monthly average MW, 2007) 
 
 
The direction of cross border flows is primarily determined by the relative prices of the countries in question. 
Figure 3.3 shows that the prices on the electricity markets follow each other reasonably closely, with the 
exception of a few periods with considerably higher prices on Belpex, the Belgian spot market. This was 
visible particularly in the fourth quarter and therefore also explains the change in the direction of the flow of 
electricity.  
 
Figure 3.3 Development in electricity prices in the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium (moving weekly 
averages, 2007) 
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The utilisation rate of the import capacity with Germany declined slightly compared to 2006 (when it was 
84%), the utilisation rate for the import capacity with Belgium was clearly lower in 2007 (2006: 80%) (see 
table 3.1). As ascertained earlier, price developments in the fourth quarter had an important impact on this.  
 
Table 3.1 Average utilisation rate of interconnection capacity (%) 
25 
 Germany  Belgium 
Import   80%  55% 
Export 9%  22% 
 
The duration curves of the utilisation rate illustrate the differences between the Dutch-German and Dutch-
Belgian connections. The average utilisation of the import capacity with Germany is clearly higher than that 
with Belgium, but the import capacity with Belgium is more often fully utilised (see figures 3.4 and 3.5). Also 
with regard to export the Dutch-Belgian border capacity was fully utilised part of the time.  
 
Figure 3.4 Utilisation rate of interconnection capacity the Netherlands – Germany, duration curves 2007 
  
 
Figure 3.5 Utilisation rate of interconnection capacity the Netherlands – Belgium, duration curves 2007 
 
                                                           
25 A differentiation according to peak and super peak hours gives a slightly higher utilisation rate for import 
capacity with Germany (81% peak and 82% super peak), the utilisation rate of export capacity remains the 
same. For import capacity with Belgium the utilisation rate is particularly higher during super peak hours 
(56% peak and 61% super peak), the utilisation rate for export capacity similarly decreases (21% peak and 
15% super peak).  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  45
 
Congestion occurs in the case of full utilisation of the interconnection capacity (so-called physical 
congestion), but can also occur virtually in the case of under-utilisation of interconnectors. In the case of full 
utilisation market players would like to import more, but are simply not able to because of physical 
limitations of the connections. When all available capacity is obtained by market players but is not fully 
utilised to import electricity when there is a price difference with neighbouring countries, there is a case of 
unutilised potential.  
 
The number of hours of full utilisation
26 of the import capacity with Germany is comparable to 2006 (when it 
was 11%
27) (see table 3.2). There was a clear increase on the Dutch-Belgian border (2006: 6%).  
 
Table 3.2 Percentage of hours with full utilisation of interconnectors 
28 
 Germany  Belgium 
Import   10%  22% 
Export 0%  6% 
 
In hours during which the price of electricity differs between countries and the border capacity is not fully 
utilised, the allocation of capacity functions sub-optimally. The number of hours with unutilised capacity
29 in 
the case of a favourable price difference saw a decrease compared to 2006 for the import capacity with 
Germany (2006: 57%) (see table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3 Percentage of hours with unutilised capacity with favourable price difference 
30 
 Germany 
Import   46% 
Export 11% 
 
Belgium is not shown in the table because market coupling (as of November 2006) has resulted in optimal 
allocation in relation to prices on the exchanges (was 61%).  
 
In the first and last month of the year in particular there is often full utilisation of the border capacity with 
Germany (see figure 3.6). The number of hours with unutilised capacity while there are price differences 
remains considerable throughout the year. 
 
                                                           
26 Full utilisation is defined as the situation in which the nominated border capacity is equal to the available 
border capacity.  
27 In comparison to the previous monitor report, a margin of 2.5% is no longer maintained. For comparison 
the figures for 2006 are recalculated (also for unutilised capacity).  
28 A differentiation according to peak and super peak hours indicates that the import capacity with Germany 
is then less often fully utilised (7% during peak and 9% during super peak) while the import capacity with 
Belgium is in fact more often fully utilised (23% during peak and 30% during super peak).  
29 Unutilised capacity is defined as the situation in which the nominated border capacity is less than the 
obtained border capacity (if this is equal to the available capacity, in other words, there is no free capacity) 
while there is a favourable price difference. 
30 Differentiation according to peak and super peak hours shows that import capacity is then less often fully 
utilised while there is a favourable price difference (52% of the peak hours, 54% of the super peak hours), for 
export capacity the percentages remain approximately the same (11% of the peak hours, 10% of the super 
peak hours).  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  46
Figure 3.6 Utilisation of interconnection capacity the Netherlands – Germany (% of the hours, per month 
2007) 
 
On the Dutch-German border it is clearly visible that even in the case of considerable price differences, the 
available border capacity is sometimes utilised far from fully (see figure 3.7).
31 The current allocation of the 
day-ahead capacity with explicit auction that takes place separate from the trade in the commodity electricity 
results in inefficient utilisation of this capacity. The interconnectors can also be used more efficiently by 
making unutilised capacity after day-ahead available for intra-day trade.  
 
Figure 3.7 Net utilisation rate the Netherlands – Germany related to price difference between the two 
countries, 2007  
                                                           
31 If the infrastructure were optimally utilised, that would save electricity consumers about 17 million euros 
per year. This is calculated as follows: in 2007 there was unutilised import capacity during about 50% of all NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  47
 
 
   
The operators of the high pressure network for gas and the high voltage network for electricity (TSOs) have 
an important task in promoting competition. This concerns a whole range of activities, such as investing in 
new capacity, making capacity (more) available, allocating capacity among the players and providing 
information to market parties. For some activities the TSOs receive incentives from the regulation of 
transport services, system services, market facilitating services, while in specific cases ad hoc incentives are 
given, such as in the realisation and management of the NorNed cable by TenneT. A specific incentive for 
making capacity available, making new investments in capacity on the national high voltage network, or 
increasing the capacity at the border connections is lacking however.  
 
In order to enable the TSO to make the optimal choices in expanding the available capacity of the network, 
extra incentives could be useful for increasing the border capacity and for other tasks (Dijk, 2008). A number 
of conditions do apply for the introduction of such incentives.  
•  The first condition for giving the right incentives is that the magnitude of benefits and costs of capacity 
expansion must be investigated (per case) in order to prevent too much or in fact too little capacity from 
being made available, which could lead to negative welfare effects.  
•  The second condition concerns the need for an integral approach of TSOs. It is important that incentives 
for capacity expansion at the borders are not isolated from other incentives for the TSOs in order to 
avoid any undesired effects. It must after all be prevented that a capacity expansion at the border comes 
at the expense of, for example, reliability or investments in the national network. It is therefore of great 
importance that incentives are not set up separate from each other, but that the incentives for the entire 
package of duties of the TSOs be set up together.  
•  The third condition for effective incentives is the international approach. Inherent to solving the capacity 
problem at the borders is the fact that capacity expansions must be optimised on both sides of the 
border. Cooperation between TSOs and between foreign regulators is very important on this point. Also 
it is important that the TSOs formulate comprehensive plans for the further development of the 
infrastructure. For this it is necessary that there is a regulator on the (regional) European level who can 
steer the TSOs as a group.  
 
A no regret policy in any event is to improve information provision on bottlenecks, devise potential measures 




The border capacity with Belgium was fully utilised on a regular basis in the first six months and the month of 
August, with June standing out when the import capacity was fully utilised more than half the time (see figure 
3.8). Especially in November and also in December the export capacity was fully utilised part of the time.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hours while there were price differences, with on average 430 MW of unutilised capacity and a price 
difference of 10 Euro (with APX being more expensive than EEX).  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  48




An important difference compared to 2006 is the presence of market coupling with Belgium and France 
(Trilateral market coupling). The trade on the electricity markets APX, Belpex and Powernext is now linked,  
taking into account the available capacity on the various borders. This leads to optimal utilisation of the 
present capacity for the day-ahead trade, which contributes largely to efficient use of the interconnection 
capacity (see figure 3.9). TSOs have not yet provided for the possibility of cross-border intra-day trade.  
 
Figure 3.9 Net utilisation rate the Netherlands – Belgium related to price difference between the two 
countries, 2007  
 




We will analyse the development of competition using the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) framework. 
The structure of the market is discussed in section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 focuses on the conduct of electricity 
producers, while the market outcomes are the subject of section 3.3.4.  
 
The electricity market is still a concentrated market. A large part of the available capacity is in the hands of a 
few companies, while these companies are also responsible for the lion’s share of production. The 
concentrated nature of the electricity market is expressed in the values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI).
32 The HHI production
33 came to an average for all hours of 1,700 in 2006, while the average value for 
2007 is 1,828. The HHI capacity
34 was on average 1,604 in 2006 and at a similar level, 1,592, in 2007.
35  
 
In interpreting the change in HHI value it is advisable to look at the causes of this change (see text box). A 
higher HHI does not necessarily mean that the degree of competition decreased in 2007, because it can also 
be the result of stronger competition. After all, if smaller producers are not able to produce at the market 
price and larger ones are, then this leads automatically (mathematically) to a higher HHI. Thus the HHI 
alone does not suffice in order to assess the market structure; more aspects need to be considered as well. 
On the basis of the HHI we can only conclude that the electricity market is still a concentrated one.  
 
                                                           
32 If the HHI is above 1,800 (the generally accepted norm), then a market is considered to be strongly 
concentrated. An HHI of between 1,200 and 1,800 indicates that a market is ‘moderately concentrated’.  
33 Calculated on the basis of the realised production and the import attributed to the parties.  
34 Calculated on the basis of the available production capacity and the import capacity attributed to the 
parties.  
35 Excluding import, the HHI capacity was 2,052 in 2006 and 2,076 in 2007. See appendix 3 for the 
development of the HHI from hour to hour.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  50
 
 
A number of indicators are used to measure the degree of competition on the electricity market. A 
concentration index, expressed for example in HHI, is a well-known and commonly applied indicator. The 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index) provides insight into the distribution of market shares among the 
players.  
 
Lower barriers to entry, bringing new entrants to the market, result in a lower degree of concentration and is 
therefore a sign of increased competition. A more aggressive attitude on the part of one or more market 
parties whereby less efficient market players lose market share or even have to leave the market results on the 
other hand in a higher degree of concentration. In both cases competition intensifies, the HHI however gives 
opposite signals.  
 
An indicator that is clearly related to the intensity of competition is profit elasticity (PE) (Boone et al., 2007). 
This new indicator is still seldom applied in practice. In order to calculate the PE (also known as the Boone 
Indicator), the levels of profit and cost must be determined for all market players. Then a relation between 
profit and cost must be derived from this, which can be interpreted as elasticity. The PE is defined as the 
percentage of decrease in the profit as the result of an increase (of 1%) in marginal costs. A larger decrease in  
profit at the same increase in costs means that the market has become more competitive, because market 
parties are then punished more harshly for their inefficiencies.  
 
Using the PE to measure the degree of competition on the electricity market is not easy (Roos, 2008). This is 
mainly due to the fluctuating demand in connection with the merit order (supply curve). Because of the 
fluctuating demand, the market in one moment is on a steeper and then another moment on a more level 
part of the merit order. The level of marginal costs of the marginal power plant therefore says little about the 
level of efficiency. In addition the profit of an electricity producer is not so much determined by the efficiency 
of the marginal power plant as by the location of its whole production park within the merit order.  
 
These complications can be accommodated by, for example, dividing up the demand into different ranges 
and taking the average costs of operating power plants as a starting point. With these corrections profit 
elasticity may be a useful indicator in measuring the degree of competition on the electricity market.   
 
In assessing the market structure, the main question is to what degree (certain) players are able to influence 
the market outcomes. The possibility of exercising market power is determined by the degree to which 
(certain) players are indispensable to meet demand. Indicators that measure this indispensability are the 
pivotal supplier index (PSI) and residual supply index (RSI).  
 
The PSI indicates what percentage of the hours (part of) the capacity of an electricity producer is needed to 
satisfy the market demand given the collective capacity of the other producers. In 2007 there was a pivotal 
supplier during 34% of the hours. During peak hours this percentage was 70% and during super peak hours 
80%. In comparison with 2006 there were more hours in 2007 during which one or more players were 
indispensable (see figure 3.10). Unlike in 2006, it also occurred in 2007 that 4 or even 5 players were 
indispensable during an hour in order to meet demand. This deterioration of the market structure can be the 
result of increased (export) demand, as a result of which the shortage in the market and with it the 
indispensability of the players increased. 
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The RSI indicates the degree to which market parties are pivotal (indispensable, necessary). The more 
capacity is needed from a player in order to meet the market demand, given the capacity of the other 
producers, the greater this player’s ability to influence market outcomes.
36 In 2007 the sector RSI, averaged 
over all hours, was virtually the same as that in 2006, namely around 1.20 (see figure 3.11). During peak 
hours the sector RSI in 2007 was on average 0.96, while it was 1.00 in 2006. The degree to which one or 





















                                                           
36 With an RSI smaller than 1, the joint capacity of the other players is insufficient to meet market demand 
and the relevant market player is pivotal. The further below 1 the RSI value, the more capacity required from 
this player and the greater the degree of indispensability.  
37 The sector RSI is the lowest value of the RSI values per player.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  52
 
In a concentrated market players can use their strong market position at times when they are indispensable 
in order to influence market outcomes. Players will only do this if the incentives are such, that is to say, when 
their profit will on balance increase as a result. Whether market parties behave strategically can possibly be 
concluded from the manner in which they use their production resources. In a competitive market all 
resources are used whose marginal costs are at least made up for by the price. If, on the other hand, 
(available) production resources are not used while that seems to be profitable, that can point to the 
existence of other (strategic) reasons.  
 
With electricity generation, many factors determine profitability, thus making it difficult to determine whether 
not (fully) using a plant at a particular moment was a good idea or not in terms of business economics. One 
of these factors is the dynamic character of the dispatch, expressed in startup costs and ramp rates. A 
method to take this dynamic aspect into account is to look at the average electricity price over a day or longer 
and relate this to the use of power plants. The underlying idea is that if the electricity price is higher than the 
level of the marginal costs for an extended period (for example a week), then the startup costs and ramp 
rates no longer pose an impediment to using the power plant.  
 
With an average electricity price of 100 euro/MWh virtually all power plants on the margin can be used 
profitably.
38 It emerges that, both in 2006 and 2007, virtually no player used all available capacity, although 
there are differences among the players. Some players turn out to utilise their available capacity more 
intensively than others. Refraining from fully using power plants when it seems that would be profitable may 
be due to factors for which no data are available, such as the existence of (cooling water) restrictions or the 
nature of fuel contracts. It is however also conceivable that strategic factors play a role (see text box). It 
should be noted that this is an ‘ex post’ analysis, while the expectations on future prices are relevant for 
decisions of dispatching power plants.  
 
Another indicator for the conduct of electricity producers is the so-called dispatch inefficiency. This indicator 
measures the difference in costs between the actual marginal power plant and the marginal power plant in 
the case of optimal dispatch. The dispatch inefficiency indicates how much more expensive the production of 
a unit of electricity by the actual marginal power plant is compared with the marginal power plant in the case 
of optimal dispatch. Although with this method little importance can be ascribed to the absolute value of the 
dispatch inefficiency, the relative value is informative.
39 A notable outcome is that in 2007 the dispatch 
inefficiency was markedly greater than in 2006 (see figure 3.12).
40 Averaged over all hours the actual marginal 
system costs were 81% higher than the optimal costs; in 2006 this percentage was 47%.  
 
Another notable outcome is that the dispatch efficiency is significantly higher on the sector level than on the 
level of individual players.
41 In other words: the difference between the actual dispatch and the optimal 
dispatch of individual players’ portfolios is markedly smaller than the difference between the actual dispatch 
and optimal dispatch of all (major) power plants together in the Netherlands.  
 
                                                           
38 See appendix 3 for an overview of the average marginal costs per type of power plant.  
39 The optimal dispatch is calculated on the basis of the marginal costs (taking into account startup costs) 
and the availability per power plant per hour. Since in this calculation it is impossible to incorporate all actual 
factors that determine the actual dispatch from hour to hour, no further conclusions can be drawn from the 
absolute value of the calculated dispatch inefficiency.  
40 NB: because of corrections to the data and improvements to the method of analysis, the values for 2006 
do not (always) correspond to the values that were included in the previous Monitor.  
41 See appendix 3 with the result of the statistical analysis. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  53
Observed inefficiencies on the individual portfolio level may be ascribed to missing information on factors 
that determine the optimal use of power plants. After all, we may assume that players will use their own 
portfolio as efficiently as possible. If a player wants to withhold capacity in order to influence market 
outcomes, then that will be capacity at the margin, that is to say, the most expensive capacity that, given the 
demand, could be operating. If, in reaction to this, another player offers a more expensive plant, then this will 
lead to higher system marginal costs on the sector level. Insofar as strategic conduct is manifested in 
dispatch inefficiency, it is therefore at the sector level.  
 




















The observation that the dispatch inefficiency is significantly higher on the sector level than on the level of 
individual players can therefore be a sign of strategic conduct in the use of power plants. It is however also 
conceivable that this is the result of other factors, such as contract obligations in the purchase of fuel or sale 
of electricity, which result in a certain player dispatching relatively expensive power plants while at the same 
time other players do not dispatch cheaper ones. Further investigation will be needed to gain more insight 
into this.  
 NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  54
 
To gain insight into the development of competition on the electricity market, the monitor adheres to the 
structure-conduct-performance framework. For market structure and market outcomes, indicators like the 
pivotal supplier index and the markup ratio are available to measure the degree of competition. Indicators 
showing whether and to what degree market parties act strategically, however, are lacking thus far.  
 
Further analyses are needed to get a better understanding of firm behaviour. A case in point is the analysis 
using dispatch inefficiency (DI) in this monitor. Here the value of the DI is not in itself decisive, but the 
statistical analyses carried out with the DI offer valuable insights. Other studies have also attempted to 
provide insight into the possible strategic conduct of producers. The extremely high prices in California in the 
summer of 2000, for example, prompted various studies (Harvey and Hogan, 2001; Joskow and Kahn, 2002). 
These empirical studies looked for evidence of withholding: not employing otherwise profitable production 
capacity in order to drive up the market price.  
 
Unutilised capacity, the so-called output gap, was taken as an indication for withholding here. But there could 
be plausible explanations for the failure to utilise capacity that, at first glance, looks profitable. The 
aforementioned studies correct as much as possible for these explanations so that the remaining gap most 
probably must be attributed to strategic conduct. This not only requires an exhaustive list of plausible 
explanations, but also clarity on the exact magnitude of these corrections. An alternative approach would be 
to examine to what extent the failure to utilise capacity is related to the opportunities and incentives that 
players experience to influence market outcomes.  
 
For individual players, for instance, the degree of indispensability (opportunity) and the position of their 
production portfolio within the merit order (incentives) may be related in an econometric analysis to an 
indicator for withholding. Research in which these variables are further defined shows significant statistical 
relations for most players (Boddeüs, 2008). This is an indication that withholding capacity is (partly) 
informed by strategic considerations. With these significant statistical relations, this withholding indicator 
can subsequently be used on sector level to explain market outcomes.  
 
Within the structure-conduct-performance framework it is particularly interesting to relate the various 
components to each other. In the monitor, the relationship between markup ratio (performance) and residual 
supply index (market structure) has already been analysed. An analysis of the relationship between market 
price (performance) and a withholding indicator (conduct) will provide further insight into competition on 




The market outcomes in 2007 are characterised by, averaged over all hours, lower electricity prices and lower 
profits than in 2006, although the prices for gas and CO2 were also lower.  
 
The electricity prices were, on average, lower both during peak hours and off-peak hours: the average peak 
price was about 20 euro/MWh lower in 2007 than in 2006 and the average off-peak price about 10 
euro/MWh (day-ahead) cheaper.
42 Because of the lower prices for gas and CO2 credits, the clean spark spread 
increased slightly (see figure 3.13). Since the coal price rose dramatically however (from about 7 to almost 14 
euro/MW), the dark spread decreased significantly (see figure 3.14). 
                                                           
42 See appendix 3 for the fuel prices and other detailed data on the market outcomes.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  55
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 The profitability of the marginal unit, that is to say, the most expensive plant that produces, was lower in 
2007 than in 2006. In 2007 the markup, averaged over all hours, was -33%, while -22% was achieved in 2006; 
during peak hours the markup in 2006 was virtually 0% and in 2007 -10%.
43 44 The differences in the markup 
between the hours are vast, varying from more than +400% to -100% (see figure 3.15). This extreme variation 
in the markup stems from strongly fluctuating demand on the one hand and the fact that the use of power 
plants is not fully attuned to short-term prices because of dynamic restraints, on the other. A manifestation of 
this is that various power plants also continue to operate at night when demand is so low that the price is 
below the marginal costs.  
 
The relatively low markup in 2007 is related to the relatively high dispatch inefficiency. Since relatively more 
expensive power plants were dispatched in 2007, the system marginal costs are higher, as a result of which 
the markup automatically turns out lower.  
 




















The height of the markup is closely related to the market structure, that is to say to the scarcity in the market 
and the position of individual players (indispensability). Figure 3.15 shows that the markup rises strongly 
when the sector RSI falls under 1. This is true for both 2006 and 2007. 
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between the markup on the one hand and the scarcity and the 
indispensability of players on the other (see appendix 3). The greater the scarcity on the market, that is to say, 
                                                           
43 That the markup, that is to say the difference between price and marginal costs as a percentage of the 
marginal costs, averaged over the whole year, is negative does not mean that the marginal power plant was 
operating at a loss on average over the year and certainly not that all the other power plants suffered a loss. 
The markup is a measure of the competition in a particular hour and of profitability. This latter one is partly 
determined by the size of production and the marginal costs of individual power plants (lower in the merit 
order).  
44 NB: as a result of corrections to the data and improvements in the method of analysis, the values for 2006 
do not (always) correspond to the values that were included in the Monitor for 2006. An important 
improvement is that now the startup costs are included, which was not the case in the past.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  57
the less unutilised capacity there is, the higher the markup. Despite the close relation between scarcity and 
indispensability, the indispensability of players also emerges to have an independent influence on the 
markup. The greater the indispensability, that is to say, the lower the sector RSI, the greater the markup.  
 



















Despite the on average negative profitability of the marginal power plant, the profitability of electricity 
generation is positive and even more than adequate to cover the fixed costs of new power plants. For all 
(large) players it is the case that the annual profit per MW is double or more the annual costs of a new plant 
(see figure 3.16).
45 In a competitive market this level of profit should lead to new investments, since it is very 
attractive, from an economic perspective at least, to produce electricity.  
 
Figure 3.16 Profitability of electricity production: frequency distribution of the ratio between profit and 

















                                                           
45 See appendix 3 for the assumptions on the discount rate, amount other things.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  58
At the moment there are various investment plans in the pipeline. After the new construction of large-scale 
power plants was announced for the first time in years in 2005, producers have since announced various new 
projects. The total of new construction plans with electricity producers amounts to about 12 GW at the 
moment. These power plants are expected to come into operation between 2009 and 2013 (see table 3.4). In 
addition to these plans for large power plants, the amount of decentralised plants is also expected to be 
expanded. The realisation of these plans depends on various factors however, such as the available space, 
environmental permits and possibilities of connecting to the high voltage network.  
 
Table 3.4 Investments in new electricity power plants in the pipeline 
Location Producer  Type  of  plant  Size  (MW)  Year of planned realisation 
Eemshaven Nuon  1
st 
phase 
Coal/gas 350  2011 
 Nuon  2
nd 
phase 
Coal /gas  850/1050  2014 
 RWE  1
st 
phase 
Coal 800  2011 
 RWE  2
nd 
phase 
Coal 800  2012 
 Electrabel  Coal  800  2012 
 Electrabel  Gas  125  2008 
 Advanced 
Power 
Gas 1200 2011 
Bergum Electrabel  Gas  454  2014 
Delfzijl Aldel  Biomass/waste  115  2014 
Lelystad Electrabel  Gas  900  2009 
Maasvlakte E.ON  Coal  1050  2012 
 Electrabel  Coal  800  2012 
 Intergen  Gas  419  2010 
 Enecogen  Gas  840  2010 
 Nn  Gas  600  2011 
Geertruidenberg Essent  Coal  800  2014 
Moerdijk Essent  Gas  430  2011 
Schoonebeek NAM  Gas  130  2011 
Borssele Delta  Gas  870  2009 
Sas van Gent  Delta  Biomass/gas 82  2010 
Maasbracht Essent Gas  220  (650)  2011 
Total    about  13,000   
Source: TenneT Quality and Capacity plan 2008-2014; NB: not all power plants yet have a connection 
agreement with TenneT  
 
If these plans are realised, improved competition is to be expected since the indispensability of (individual) 
players will decrease. In the event, for example, that the production park were to expand by 6000 MW, while 
the demand for electricity increases by 3% per year and the gas price is 25% higher, then the RSI in 5 years 
would come to 1.7 (compared to 1.2 currently) and the percentage of unutilised capacity would increase from 
36% to 50%. It follows from the aforementioned statistical relationship between market structure and 




This section analyses the development of liquidity on the various marketplaces. In a liquid market standard 
transactions can generally be carried out quickly. That is to say, a counterparty can quickly be found for every 
transaction and a great volume can be traded per transaction without having an appreciable effect on the 
price. Liquidity minimises the transaction costs and inspires confidence in market parties. This in turn draws 
more parties to the market, improving the liquidity further.  
 
Growing market volume, fewer price peaks and decreasing price sensitivity are signs of improved liquidity on 
the power exchange. Less volatile prices and a lower bid-ask spread indicate that supply and demand are 
better matched on the OTC market and that individual transactions can therefore be better absorbed by the 
market. This section will discuss: trade on the APX spot market, trade in standardised OTC forward contracts, 
international comparison and transparency.  
 
APX is a marketplace for trade in day-ahead contracts and since 2006, also for trade in intra-day contracts. A 
price is reached on the basis of an auction for each individual hour. The total trade volume in day-ahead 
contracts on the APX in 2007 was 20.7 TWh, an increase of 1.5 TWh compared to last year (see figure 3.17).  
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The number of price peaks on the APX decreased compared to 2006 (see figure 3.18). 
 
Figure 3.18 Price peaks on the APX (number of hours in which APX price listed higher than 100 euro/MWh), 
2006 and 2007 
 
 
Figure 3.19 shows that the price sensitivity of additional demand bids in 2007 was lower than in the previous 
year. The month of April was an exception to this.
46  
  
Figure 3.19 Price sensitivity on the APX (price increase in percentage points in case of 50/ 250/ 500MW 
additional demand), 2006 and 2007 
  
 
                                                           
46 The simulations for 2006 and 2007 have a different approach. In 2006 the border capacity was fixed, and 
for 2007 the TLC environment was used for calculation.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  61
 
With growing volume, fewer price peaks and decreasing price sensitivity liquidity on the APX developed in a 
favourable direction. A similar picture is presented by the liquidity survey. Almost half of the respondents felt 
that liquidity on the APX has improved, while about the same number said they felt liquidity was stable.    
 
 
Standardised forward contracts are traded on Endex or via brokers (OTC). In order to gain insight into the 
liquidity of the forward trade, traded volumes are reported for Endex; for the OTC market in general the 
spread between bid and offer prices and daily price fluctuations were looked at.  
 
The total trade volume on Endex fell in 2007 by 30.2 TWh (see figure 3.20). The decline occurred in both the 
futures exchange and the OTC clearing.  
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The spread between bid and offer prices on the OTC market showed fewer singular extremes in 2006, but it 
did increase in general (see figures 3.21 and 3.22).
47 Asked for their opinion in the liquidity survey on the 
bid/offer spread, two-thirds of traders said they thought it was high or too high.  
 
Figure 3.21 Spread between bid and offer prices on the OTC for monthly contracts, peak (duration curve, 
2006 and 2007) 
  
Figure 3.22 Spread between bid and offer prices for monthly contracts on the OTC (monthly averages, 2006 




                                                           
47 For year contracts (base) there were fewer singular extremes in the spread in 2007 and the level was 
comparable to that of 2006 (see appendix 3).  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  63
 
The volatility of the prices on the OTC market had more singular extremes in 2007 and was in general also 
higher (see figures 3.23 and 3.24).
48 Asked for their opinion on the price volatility in the liquidity survey, two-
thirds of the traders said they thought it was high.  
 
Figure 3.23 Volatility of the prices for monthly contracts, peak, on the OTC (duration curve, 2006 and 2007) 
  
 




                                                           
48 For year contracts (base) there were fewer singular extremes in 2007 in the volatility and the level was 
comparable with that of 2006 (see appendix 3). NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  64
In 2007 the volumes (traded and cleared) on Endex were lower than in 2006. An increase in the spread 
between bid and offer prices for monthly contracts was visible on the OTC, although singular extremes had 
mostly disappeared, and at the same time there was an increase in the volatility of the prices. For year 
contracts the level of bid/offer spread and price volatility was comparable to 2006. The liquidity on the OTC 
market therefore moved in an unfavourable direction. This picture is confirmed in the liquidity survey. More 
than half the traders are of the opinion that the liquidity on the OTC has decreased. Still almost a fifth of 




Various indicators are available for measuring liquidity. The market monitor makes use of volumes traded, 
price sensitivity to additional demand, spread between bid and offer prices and volatility (price fluctuations). 
These indicators reflect relevant properties of liquid markets such as resilience (that is to say, large orders 
have a limited effect on the price) and tightness (that is to say, high volumes traded with a limited spread).  
 
The concept of liquidity is mainly a notion in the financial world. Prominent indicators of liquidity are daily 
turnover measure, Amihud’s measure, Roll’s measure, LOT measure and Amivest measure (Lesmond, 
2005). Since these indicators are defined on financial markets, they include components that are less relevant 
for electricity markets, such as return on investment. Also particular characteristics of electricity markets, 
such as the impossibility of storage, make an application of these indicators not seem feasible or useful. For 
the spot forward price ratio and open interest  these considerations do not apply. However, the spot forward 
price ratio cannot go further than one month ahead and even then fluctuations in fuel costs can distort the 
analysis. The open interest is extremely laborious, since it requires information on positions of the open 
forward and option contracts.  
 
What is striking about the liquidity indicators from the financial world is the ubiquity of the bid/offer spread. 
Several indicators incorporate this spread in their formula and other indicators are defined in relation to the 
bid/offer spread. With volatility it’s a different story. In the financial world the concept of volatility is mainly 
applied to the areas of risk management and option valuation. Volatility is about the uncertainty that 
accompanies price fluctuations. An interesting question is to what extent high volatility also implies an 
illiquid market.    
 
To this end the relationship between volatility and liquidity has been further investigated (Krishna, 2008). In 
this research day-ahead contracts were taken as an example. Since price movements on the electricity market 
often go together with rapid changing market conditions (demand, scarcity, fuel costs), an attempt was made 
to isolate fluctuations in price which bear no relation to these conditions. This ‘pure’ form of volatility in APX 
prices is then related to the bid/offer spread (OTC), whereby the latter serves as a measure of liquidity. No 
clear statistical relationship between volatility and bid/offer spread emerges from this analysis, which 
suggests that volatility on the APX is not a sign of illiquidity. In order to reach more definitive conclusions, 




An international comparison provides insight into whether the developments on the Dutch wholesale market 
also occur in other countries or are in fact unique to the Netherlands. In this section the spot markets of the 
Netherlands (APX), Germany (EEX) and France (Powernext) are compared in terms of volumes traded and NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  65
price peaks. For the forward markets of these countries, the price development, spread between bid and offer 
prices, and daily price fluctuations (volatility) are looked at.  
 
Volumes traded on the three markets also increased further in 2007, although the trade volumes can vary a 
great deal month on month. Relative to the size of the national markets, volumes on APX are high compared 
with Powernext and the development of volume lags somewhat behind that of EEX (see figure 3.25). 
 
Figure 3.25 Volumes traded on the APX, EEX and Powernext in TWh per month, 2004 through 2007  
 
 
Price peaks usually occur on the exchangesI in the same periods. The number of price peaks is also 
somewhat comparable. What is striking is that the level of these prices differs from exchange to exchange. At 
the end of May APX peaked significantly for a number of hours without the price level of EEX or Powernext 
coming close to it. Mid-November prices on EEX and especially Powernext were many times higher than 
prices on the APX for several hours (see figure 3.26).  
 
Figure 3.26 Price peaks on the APX, EEX, Powernext (number of hours that price > 100 euro/MWh) per 
quarter and price levels (on APX > 100 euro/MWh) per day, in 2007 
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On the OTC forward market the prices in the Netherlands, Germany and France follow each other to a 
reasonable degree (see figure 3.27). In the last quarter the higher prices in France are remarkable. The 
substantially higher prices in the Netherlands during 2006 are no longer visible in monthly contracts (peak) 
in 2007. For year contracts (base), there’s still a difference (see appendix 3).  
 





From an international perspective, the Netherlands has a clearly higher spread between bid and offer prices. 




Figure 3.28 Spread between bid and offer prices and volatility
50 of the prices on OTC for monthly contracts, 
peak, per quarter in 2007 
                                                           
49 This is also noticeable with year contracts (base) (see appendix 3). 
50 Volatility is calculated as the ratio between the price at time t and the price at time t-1. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  67
   
 
A transparent wholesale market for electricity contributes significantly to matching demand for and supply of 
electricity at the lowest possible costs. Transparency means that traders have access to relevant and accurate 
information so that they can buy and sell electricity at minimum transaction costs. Relevant market 
information includes information about the availability of production capacity, transmission capacity and 
cross border capacity; information on the rules of exchanges market and auctions (including calculation 
methods), and information about the results of trade: prices and volumes.  
 
The liquidity survey shows that traders are not satisfied with the transparency in production, transparency in 
demand and, to a lesser degree, transparency in transmission (see figure 3.29). In comparison to the 
previous survey among traders, dissatisfaction with the information provision about available production 
capacity and realised production has clearly increased.  
 
Figure 3.29 Traders’ opinions on information provision on transmission, generation, demand 
 
 
Also in the area of cross border capacity traders see much room for improvement in information provision 
(see figure 3.30). More than half of respondents are not satisfied with transparency in the calculation method, 
nominations and actual use of the cross border capacity. Here too the dissatisfaction among traders has 
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Figure 3.30 Traders’ opinions on degree of information provision on cross border capacity  
  
 
In the area of trade, traders are of the opinion that transparency on the OTC market is still too low (see figure 
3.31). This concerns in particular the volumes traded and the number of active traders. Compared with last 
year, traders have a more positive view on the transparency level on the OTC market however. 
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Since the gas and electricity markets are closely connected, it is important to investigate to what degree the 
functioning of the one market is affected by the functioning of the other. Section 4.2 analyses to what extent 
the functioning of the electricity market depends on how the gas market works. The converse relationship is 




There is a great deal of interconnectedness between the gas and electricity markets. A considerable share of 
the electricity produced in the Netherlands is generated by gas-fired power plants that are often also the 
price-setting power plant (see table 4.1). Consequently the prices for gas production, gas transport and gas 
trade are an important component in the pricing of electricity. In chapter 3 it became clear that the gas price 
is also an important factor behind the profitability of electricity companies. The profitability of the marginal 
power plant is subject to larger or smaller fluctuations partly under the influence of the fluctuating gas price. 
The profitability of the total electricity production is, for the rest, largely determined by the gas prices that are 
included in bilateral (long-term) contracts. 
 
Table 4.1 Linkages between gas and electricity markets in a physical sense 
 2006  2007 
Installed capacity for generating electricity according to 
technique and type of fuel (MW) 
  
- central    14,220 
  - natural-gas-fired power plants    9,230 
  - coal-fired power plants    3,500 
  - other (incl. blast-furnace gas
52 and nuclear)    1,490 
- decentral    6,100 
 




- power producers   8,320  8,935 
- gas-distribution companies  21,627  20,182 
- other direct deliveries  14,795  14,370 
Source: CBS, ECN 
 
The demand for gas from power producers is in turn very important for the Dutch gas market: about 20% of 
the domestic gas supply is destined for electricity generation. Because of (drastically) increased coal prices 
and lower gas prices on the spot market, in 2007
53 production by gas power plants increased and along with 
it the demand for natural gas. The demand for gas from (by?) power plants is expected to continue to 
                                                           
51 This chapter is partly based on research that SEO/SLEA carried out at the NMa’s request and the talks held 
with market parties in that context. The content of this chapter is of course the responsibility of the NMa.  
52 Combinated with natural gas; fluctuations in the supply of blast-furnace gas are cushioned via the use of 
natural gas.  
53 See appendix 3. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  70
increase as a result of the further tightening of the climate policy. The various plans for constructing new gas-
power plants are concrete signals of this kind of increase (see table 3.5 in chapter 3). This shows that 
developments on the electricity market have a direct effect on the gas market.  
 
The interconnection between the gas and electricity markets can also be seen from the growing horizontal 
integration on company level, whereby companies are active on both markets. Electricity companies invest in 
gas storage, are active in gas trading, and since recently, also in gas production. Gas production companies 
are seeking contact with electricity companies to jointly form new companies. Horticultural firms, which were 
primarily gas consumers in the past, are increasingly also becoming flexible electricity producers
54 arbitrating 
between the gas and electricity markets. Moreover, the purchase of gas by electricity producers is becoming 
more and more coordinated with the sale of electricity, while in the past gas contracts were concluded 





The key question in assessing how the functioning of the gas market affects the electricity market is whether 
electricity producers are limited in their decisions by unnecessary impediments on (within?)the gas market. 
From a competition perspective, it does not therefore concern situations in which electricity producers 
encounter ‘nuisance’ from gas prices, which are high because there is growing demand for gas, for example. 
In that case the high gas prices reflect scarcity and, from an economic perspective, it is in fact good that all 
gas consumers, including electricity producers, take into account this high gas price in their daily (and 
hourly) decisions. High prices that stem from a faulty functioning of the gas market are, on the other hand, 
relevant from a competition perspective because these also distort the electricity market.  
 
We take the different types of decisions made by electricity producers as a starting point for the analysis. 
These producers need a certain type of gas (gas quality) and want to receive that gas in particular quantities 
at certain times (flexibility) and moreover they want the freedom to deviate from that later on (balancing).  
 
Electricity companies use both H and L gas, depending on which network the different power plants are 
connected to. For H gas customers can now go to different suppliers, but for L gas customers are largely 
dependent on GasTerra because of the limited possibilities for quality conversion (see chapter 2). Technically 
parties have the option of doing the conversion themselves, but that is not only quite costly, the yields are 
also uncertain because of uncertainty about the regulation of quality conversion. Because of the pending 
change to the regulation regime for quality conversion, whereby the booking system will be scrapped, the 
limited availability of quality conversion should in future no longer be a problem for gas customers.  
 
Because the demand for electricity varies strongly over time, the demand for gas from electricity producers is 
also subject to great variation. It is after all primarily the gas-power plants that are used to step up electricity 
production during the day so that the peak demand can be met. To what degree does the gas market 
currently meet the need of electricity producers to be able to buy in gas flexibly?  
 
                                                           
54 In horticulture, there are now about 2500 MW in gas engines set up.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  71
The TTF meets this need to a limited degree. The supply of products on TTF is limited, as emerged in chapter 
2 as well. The so-called gas blocks are large, and consequently customers do not have many options in 
putting together different profiles. Buying flexibly in advance is difficult for small producers such as 
horticultural firms.  
 
It is very important for electricity producers to have good access to liquid markets like TTF, where they are 
not exclusively bound to contracts. When locked into gas contracts in which they are fined heavily if gas 
demand within a particular time period turns out to be higher or lower than the contractually agreed 
amounts, electricity producers will not respond so quickly to fluctuating electricity prices as they would if the 
extra gas needed could be purchased on a liquid gas market. The shorter the time period for which the 
volume requirement applies, the drastically fewer the possibilities for operating flexibly.
55 
 
The need for more flexibility on the gas market also applies for horticultural firms. Forwards for these firms, 
for instance, are linked to the oil price, but they would rather use the day prices for gas so as to be able to 
respond to that. The existing take-or-pay contracts moreover result in fines for gardeners when they do not 
take the agreed amount (within a specified time period). These fines reduce their options for arbitrating 
between the electricity and gas markets. Technically gardeners would be able to offer capacity of about 
300,000 m
3/h on an imbalance market, by hooking up or disconnecting for activities that are not tied to a 
certain time (steaming soil) or heat storage. Because of the absence of a liquid gas spot market on which 
different types of products (including small products) are sold, not enough use is made of these 
opportunities. Gardeners want to be able to buy certain volumes for the next day at the TTF prices in order to 
be able to coordinate their gas transactions with their transactions on the APX. 
 
The TTF only has day prices, no hour prices, while the power can be sold on the APX at hour prices. To the 
extent day prices deviate from the cost structure for gas, there could be a case of inefficiency. Peak-load 
consumers get a relatively good deal then and base-load consumers have to pay relatively more. Another 
impediment in the relationship between the two markets is the different timing of the markets. For electricity 
a day runs from 0 to 24 hours, but for gas it is from 6 am to 6 am the next day (the so-called ‘gas day’). That 
results in mismatches (of 6 hours) in predictions for day-ahead.  
 
Customers want to be able to do more on TTF, not only in terms of liquidity, but also of tradability (re-entry). 
Because of the increasing demand from market parties, including electricity producers, the TTF will further 
develop. The speed at which that will happen seems to be slowing, as emerged in chapter 2. Additional policy 
is therefore needed to make the TTF into an important market.  
 
In particular for L gas, GasTerra will have to be stimulated to offer more types of products, as the Minister of 
Economic Affairs plans to do, according to her Gas letter of February 2008. If GasTerra only offers large 
blocks, then the effect for the market is still limited. After all, gas consumers, like electricity producers and 
especially horticultural firms , need the possibility of being able to trade in small quantities of gas. The 
development of the TTF will lead to more options for market parties to offer flexibility, which will 
                                                           
55 For the rest, it must be considered that products that are traded on a liquid market have a different 
character than products that are sold under contract (so-called dedicated supplies). A block of gas in itself is 
actually a firm take-or-pay contract, but with the possibility of selling it again, which is also a form of 
flexibility. The traditionally acceptable contracts are of the type do-as-you-please, in which the customer has a 
great deal of freedom within the year to take as much as they want on a year basis but the agreed amount is 
taken. The advantage of the take-or-pay contract is that the supplier has certainty about the gas sales, which 
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automatically prompt an increase in the competition on the gas market and enable the costs for gas 
customers to decrease.  
 
In addition to the development of the TTF as a liquid marketplace, a market-based balancing regime can also 
bring down the gas costs for electricity producers. The current balancing regime in the gas market gives 
market parties few possibilities for efficiently managing the costs of imbalance. The market-based balancing 
system that exists in the electricity market is perceived by market parties as clearly more appealing.
56 The 
imbalance market on the electricity market is a properly functioning market in which the balancing takes 
place in an efficient manner. The gas demand connected with balancing on the electricity market is, for the 
rest, rather limited, since the share of the imbalance in the total production is small (a few percentage 
points).  
 
Elements of a market-based balancing regime include sufficient balancing information for the time unit in 
which balancing must take place (at the moment therefore on an hourly basis) and real-time market prices, 
so that market parties know their position and can respond quickly and thus balance. A market-based 
balancing system can also be an incentive for market parties to invest in gas storage.  
 
With a new balancing regime in the gas market, electricity producers will respond more to imbalance 
situations on the gas market, and therefore make a greater appeal on balancing for the electricity market. The 
interconnectedness of the gas and electricity markets will further increase as a result.  
 
 
Developments on the electricity market are of great importance for the gas market, but it is not the case that 
the functioning of the gas market is impeded by imperfections in the electricity market.  
 
Because of the growth of wind power, the demand for flexibility in the gas market will most likely increase. 
More gas-power plants are needed that respond flexibly to the fluctuations in the production of wind turbines 
due to weather conditions. The greater demand for flexibility in the gas market can strengthen the position of 
incumbent suppliers. On the other hand, the supply of gas flexibility will increase through investments (by 
power producers) in gas storage.  
 
 
The electricity market is impeded by imperfections in the gas market, but the opposite is hardly the case. 
Improving the operation of the gas market would therefore benefit the electricity market, while the electricity 
market would at the same time be able to contribute positively to providing flexibility on the gas market.  
 
Because of the limited availability of quality conversion, electricity producers, like other gas customers, are 
largely dependent on the largest supplier for L gas. Because of the impending change to the regulation 
regime for quality conversion, whereby the system of advance booking will be lifted, the limited availability of 
quality conversion will no longer pose a problem to gas customers.  
                                                           
56 Keeping the network in balance is less complex for gas than for electricity because of the possibility of 
storing gas, a possibility that does not exist for electricity. For electricity the international frequency support 
plays a role in balancing, and consequently there is a backup country that can provide help in solving 
imbalance situations. The United Kingdom lacks such international support, which means that the balancing 
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An important bottleneck is still the absence of liquid markets for flexibility and balancing on the gas market. 
Adjusting the balancing regime, improving balancing information and thus enabling parties to respond in 
real time will most likely bring vast improvement to this area. In addition it is important that the development 
of the TTF be promoted by stimulating the largest party in some way or other to offer more volume in 





The integration of the national energy markets into (regional) European energy markets is an important 
means of improving competition and profiting from the advantages of international trade. The integration of 
the Dutch gas and electricity market with neighbouring energy markets is therefore a topic that is high on the 
policy agenda.
57 Section 5.2 describes how the Dutch market is interconnected with the markets in 
neighbouring countries, section 5.3 then gives an overview of the activities that are being undertaken 





In 2007 the Dutch electricity market only had cross-border connections with Germany and Belgium. As of 
2008 it is also connected with Norway, while a connection with the United Kingdom is currently the subject 
of study.  
•  Under normal conditions 3600 MW in interconnection capacity are available for the market via the 
connections with Germany and Belgium, but under favourable conditions that can run to as much as 
3850 MW. The connection with Germany is not efficiently used however, as became clear in chapter 3. 
Introduction of market coupling and intra-day trade is urgently needed to improve utilisation of the 
existing border capacity.  
•  The connection with Norway, the NorNed cable, was put into operation in May 2008, with a (physical) 
capacity of 700 MW. Because of the great price differences between the two countries, particularly during 
peak hours, the auction of this capacity achieved good results with prices of tens of euros and 
sometimes more than 100 euro/MW.  
•  The possible introduction of a BritNed cable (about 1000 MW) in a few years time will establish a 
physical connection with the United Kingdom.  
 
The Dutch gas network is connected with Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom.  
•  The Netherlands imports H gas from Germany (Emden-Oude Statenzijl) and Belgium (Zelzate). The 
total technical import capacity was just over 30,000 MW in 2007. The infrastructure for import of high 
calorific gas is not efficiently utilised however (see chapter 2 on this). This would be better utilised if 
unused transport capacity were reallocated via a secondary market. In 2008 a few initiatives were already 
started to achieve this in an efficient manner, for example via day-ahead sale of firm capacity via energy 
markets APX and Trac-X. 
•  H gas is exported to Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The export capacity of H gas to 
Germany and Belgium comes to a total of about 20,000 MW. In 2007 at no point were all export clusters 
for H gas simultaneously fully utilised. Individual export points were fully utilised and more often fully 
utilised than in 2006.  
•  The export connection to the United Kingdom (the so-called Balkzand-Bacton Line (BBL)) was put into 
operation in mid-2007.  
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•  L gas is exported to Belgium and Germany via various export points. Just as for H gas, there was never a 
time in 2007 when the export points for L gas were all fully utilised.  
 
 
The trade flows for electricity are largely determined by differences in production parks and differences in fuel 
prices. The majority of the electricity produced in the Netherlands each year comes from gas-fired power 
plants. Also in comparison to neighbouring countries, a relatively high amount of electricity in the 
Netherlands is generated using natural gas as fuel. In Germany the emphasis is on production with coal 
power plants while in Belgium and France the emphasis is on nuclear power plants. Despite the rising coal 
price, the Netherlands imported primarily from Germany towards the end of 2007 and exported increasingly 
to Belgium because of the higher electricity prices in Belgium and France (see figure 5.1). For the whole of 
2007 the Netherlands’ import decreased while export increased. The import balance amounted to 17.6 TWh 
in 2007, about 4 TWh less than in 2006.  
 
Figure 5.1 Import and export of electricity per hour to/from Belgium and Germany, 2006 and 2007  
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The gas market is moving in the opposite direction however: import of gas is increasing while domestic 
production is decreasing. Nevertheless the Netherlands is still a major exporter of gas. About 60% of the 
total supply of gas on the Dutch market is sold to other countries (see appendix 2). This increasingly 
concerns gas that is first imported (so-called transit gas). At the exit points at the border, gas can be 
introduced into the Dutch high pressure network via ‘backhaul’ (in an administrative sense), whereby import 
flows are cancelled out against export flows. Towards the end of 2007 the imported gas came mostly from 
Germany (see figure 5.2) 
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With electricity, the limited availability of transport capacity on the Dutch-German border (still) leads to 
frequent (large) price differences between the markets in both countries (the APX and the EEX, respectively) 
(see figure 5.3). There is more convergence between the Dutch, Belgian and French markets, thanks to the 
market coupling introduced in 2006, as a result of which transport capacity is more efficiently utilised. On 
average over the whole of 2007, the price difference between EEX and APX was -3.9 euro/MWh and between 
Powernext and APX on average -1.0 euro/MWh. 
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The gas markets of the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom are becoming increasingly integrated. 
This emerges from a comparison of the day-ahead and year-ahead prices on TTF with those on the NBP and 
Zeebrugge (see figure 2.22
58).
59 The price differences on the OTC market between the Dutch market TTF, NBP 
(UK) and Zeebrugge (Belgium) have decreased dramatically. In 2007 there was virtually full correlation 
between the three markets (see also appendix 2). This means that the infrastructure connections between 
these countries, including the BBL which came into operation in 2007, make sufficient arbitrage between the 
markets possible.  
 
Figure 5.4 Gas prices, day-ahead and year-ahead products on the TTF, NPP, Zeebrugge and BEB (only day-






National governments, regulators, TSOs and the European Commission are working in different ways and in 
different committees to further integrate the national energy markets into (regional) European markets. The 
European Commission’s proposed package of measures
60 for the energy market has dominated the 
European policy agenda since publication in September 2007 (section 5.3.2). The regulators are working 
closely with each other, and with TSOs, to further integrate the gas market (section 5.3.3) and remove the 
impediments in the electricity market (section 5.3.4). 
 
                                                           
58 For day-ahead the German market BEB is also included from June 2007.  
59 Since gas is virtually never traded but sold directly to the client (supply company, bulk consumer or client 
abroad), there are no market prices available (except from the TTF).  
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The Third package from the European Commission consists of proposals for changes to European directives 
and regulations for the gas and electricity markets, with the aim of removing any impediments that still exist 
to a properly functioning internal market.
61 The proposals are related to six areas: TSOs, national regulators, a 
European regulator, unbundling of energy companies, transparency and security of supply. Since publication 
these proposals have been the subject of intense discussion, in which the last word has not yet been heard. 
In general many agree with the general tenor of the proposals. This tenor is, among other things, that the 
TSOs must cooperate more within Europe and that they should make joint network plans, that the national 
regulators should be independent and that there is a need for a regulator on the European level. The network 
companies must be effectively unbundled from commercial activities such as production and trade, while 
increasing transparency is very important for market parties to gain access to infrastructure and markets. 
 
The liberalisation of the gas market has resulted in the gas price on the European (H) gas market being more 
affected by competitive pressure, but there are still major impediments here to competition.
62 These 
impediments are being addressed on various levels in the European context. In the first place the European 
Commission itself is active in removing impediments. The conclusion of bilateral long-term contracts 
between wholesalers and customers is under pressure for instance. These long running gas contracts are 
seen as an impediment to competition. In 2007 the Belgian gas company Distrigas was the first in Europe to 




The CEER and ERGEG
64 ensure via guidelines (guidelines for good practice) that European regulators have 
uniform opinions on a number of topics. They also advise the European Commission in making changes to 
the directives and guidelines. In 2007 the Commission’s Third package played a major role in the work of 
these consultation bodies. In 2007 ERGEG reported on transparency, among other things.  
 
In addition to the efforts of the European Commission itself, European energy regulators work within the Gas 
Regional Initiative (GRI) to remove cross-border trade restrictions. The regions were started in order to 
accelerate the discussion on the cross-border issues in the European context. The GRI North-West, to which 
the Netherlands belongs, set down a roadmap at the start of 2008 which identified two priorities: a lack of 
transparency and a shortage of available transport capacity.  
 
With regard to the spearhead of ‘transparency’, the GRI strives towards uniform and timely availability of 
information. At the moment there is insufficient information available for effective market functioning, and 
the information that is published varies vastly from country to country. In 2007 already results were achieved 
with regard to improvement of transparency for both storage and transport capacity in the GRI NW. In 
cooperation with market parties the improvements were identified and TSOs and SSOs published plans and 
undertook the first actions. Regionally there is the problem surrounding the minus 3 confidentiality 
requirement. This regulation stipulates that the availability and utilisation of import and export capacity at 
                                                           
61 In the last two rounds of legislation, the liberalisation of the energy markets was put into motion and the 
deregulation of the various groups of energy customers was decided, respectively.  
62 European Commission, Gas sector inquiry. 
63 Het Financieele Dagblad, 12 October 2007. 
64 The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) is the cooperative organisation of independent energy 
regulators. The European Regulators' Group for electricity and gas (ERGEG) advises the Commission. In fact 
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border connections where less than three market parties are active is confidential. It should be possible to 
resolve this issue in 2008.  
 
The GRI also works on the shortage of available transport capacity across the borders. The capacity is often 
fully booked but is rarely fully utilised (see also chapter 2). By promoting secondary trade in interconnection 
capacity, the GRI hopes to make more capacity available. As of May 2008 energy exchanges APX (the 
Netherlands) and Trac-X (Germany) started a project for the secondary trade in transport capacity at the 
Bunde-Oude Statenzijl and Ellund border point. In addition to this, legal obstacles to the auction of primary 
capacity have been brought to the attention of the various governments with the request that these be 
resolved. These governments responded positively to the information. In 2007 a joint open season was held 
between France and Belgium for Tainières/Blaregnies.  
 
The GRI NW is also extremely important as an instrument for improving the cooperation between regulators, 
ministries, TSOs and market parties. In 2007 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by all regulators 
of the GRI NW in order to improve this cooperation.  
 
In 2007 the Gas Platform, a consultation among the energy ministries of the Netherlands, Germany, France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, was started. In two working groups this forum focuses on competition on the gas 
market and on security of supply. The working group on competition addresses the legal impediments that 




65 and TSOs of the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg set up an Action 
plan for the central western region in February 2007 with the aim of removing obstacles to integration of the 
electricity market. This action plan includes the implementation of an implicit market coupling for the day-
ahead market as one of the action points. The action plan also talks about the implementation of cross-
border intra-day and balancing trade as well as the implementation of transparency requirements from the 
directive and a regional monitor. Other points include: harmonisation and improvement of the explicit 
auctions for the long term; common calculation of cross-border capacity; maximising the quantity and use of 
cross-border capacity and a regional plan for investments in capacity. It is very important for further market 
integration that all these action points are carried out. In the short term the priority is day-ahead market 
coupling, transparency and the intra-day trade.  
 
On 6 June 2007 the ministries, regulators and TSOs of the Benelux, France and Germany signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding. It was agreed that cooperation on the cross-border trade would be 
improved, which will lead to the creation of a Central Western European market in accordance with the 
Regulation and the Directive. In order to achieve this, two support groups were formed, one for the 
realisation of the flow-based market coupling and one for the improvement of the security of supply. In 
addition all action points from the regulators’ action plan were once again confirmed and the signatories 
committed themselves to realising these action points.  
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Balancing regime  The operator of the high pressure gas network (GTS) has set up a 
‘balancing regime’, including incentives (fines), to induce shippers to 
remain in balance, that is they ensure the quantity of gas they put in the 
system is equal to the amount they take out.  
 
Clean spark spread   The difference between the electricity price and the gas and CO2 price 
corrected for fuel efficiency.  
 
Dark spread  The difference between the electricity price and the coal price corrected for 
fuel efficiency. 
 
Degree of coverage  This measure of profitability is the ratio between the profit per MW on the 
one hand and the annual costs per MW for investment in a new power 
plant on the other.  
 
Dispatch inefficiency  A measure of the efficiency of the use of power plants. The dispatch 
inefficiency is calculated as the difference between the marginal costs for 
actual dispatch and the marginal costs for optimal dispatch, as a 
percentage of the marginal costs for optimal dispatch.  
 
HHI  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of concentration. The HHI 
is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the 
individual companies. The European Commission uses a value of 1,800 as 
a benchmark: if the HHI is greater than 1,800 then the market is 
considered to be concentrated.  
 
Interconnection  Cross-border connection in the gas or electricity network.  
 
Markup  The difference between the electricity price (APX) and the system marginal 
costs as a percentage of the system marginal costs. 
 
Merit order  The ranking of the power plants according to their marginal costs 
(increasing).  
 
MW        Mega Watt = 1000 KW  
 
Off-peak hours  The period between 11 pm and 7 am on working days and all hours during 
the weekend and on holidays.  
 
OTC  OTC stands for ‘over the counter’ trade, which means that the trade is 
undertaken via brokers.  
 
Peak hours  The period between 7 am and 11 pm on working days.  
 
PSI  The Pivotal Supplier Index measures whether a player is indispensable for 
meeting the total demand at a certain time. The PSI is equal to 1 if the NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  83
collective capacity of the other players is insufficient to meet the demand, 
otherwise the PSI is equal to 0 during that hour.  
 
Quality conversion  Changing the energy content of gas, which can be done by mixing gas with 
a high energy content (H gas) with gas with a low energy content (L gas) or 
by adding nitrogen to H gas.  
 
RSI  The Residual Supply Index measures the degree to which a particular 
player is needed (‘pivotal’) in order to meet the total demand. The RSI of a 
producer is calculated by dividing the collective generation capacity of the 
other producers by the total load for an hour.  
 
Scarcity index  The sum of the unutilised production and import capacity as a percentage 
of the total production and import capacity.  
 
Sector RSI      The lowest RSI of all producers at a particular moment.  
 
Shipper  Shippers are companies that have gas transported over the national 
network. They book entry capacity and exit capacity with GTS. The main 
role of shippers is to balance portfolios (the collection of entry and exit 
contracts). There are currently about 75 licensed shippers, who are 
affiliated with international energy companies (such as Statoil, Vattenfall 
and E.ON), banks (such as Barclays and Deutsche Bank) or supply 
companies (such as Delta, Eneco, Nuon and Essent).  
 
Spark spread  The difference between the electricity price and the gas price corrected for 
fuel efficiency.  
 
Super peak hours  The period between 9 am and 6 pm on working days.  
 
System marginal costs    The marginal costs of the most expensive power plant to operate.  
 
TTF  TTF stands for Title Transfer Facility and is a virtual market on the high 
pressure network of GTS. Shippers can buy and sell gas here, whereby GTS 
takes care of the administrative processing thereof.  
 
Utilisation rate   A measure of the degree to which available capacity is used. In the case of 
interconnection capacity, the utilisation rate is defined as the ratio of 
nominated border capacity to available capacity.  
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There is currently sufficient natural gas available in the Netherlands. The domestic production of natural gas 
has been under pressure for several years however. Since 2006 there has been a production cap on the 
Groningen field of 425 bcm until 2016 (on average 415 TWh per year). The production from small fields is 
expected to steadily decline over the coming years.  
 


















The quantity of gas that flows via the transport network in the Netherlands is measured by GTS. A national 
gas balance can be drawn up using all this measuring data. Differences in the gas balance can occur as a 
result of unmeasured losses, for example since compression stations make use of gas from the network.  
 















































































































































Historical supply 'small fields' Historical supply Groningen
Supply in accordance with extraction plan Expected supply from undeveloped sources
Expected supply from sources to be discovered Maximale productie GroningenNMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  85
Gas balance in 2006 and 2007 (source GTS) 
 
                
production  H     382,033        398,574    
   L     347,968        309,970    
from storage  H     13,824        17,483    
   L     10,636        26,482    
of which     G     10,507        16,245 
      G+     129        10,237 
import  H     227,652        232,304    
   L     0        0    
              
                       
                       
consumption  H     123,883        134,437    
   L     288,705        266,206    
of which     G     23,161        6,322 
      G+     265,544        259,884 
to storage  H     11,335        10,658    
   L     11,172        20,219    
of which     G     11,172        8,091 
      G+     0        12,128 
export  H     248,050        283,246    
   L     297,458        296,439    
of which     G     36,361        44,632 
      G+     5,547        4,630 
      L     255,550        247,177 
correction
66                 -31,845    
              
 
 
It can be seen from the progress of gas flows over several years that since 2004 domestic production has 
decreased and import has increased. It can also be seen that domestic consumption is decreasing and the 
export of gas is rising.  
 
Progress of domestic production, import, domestic consumption and export in the years 2000 through 2007 
(source: CBS) 













                                                           



























































































The production of L gas is far more temperature sensitive than the production of H gas. This is because L gas 
is primarily used for households, while H gas is primarily used for industry.  
 
 















Temperature dependency of the production of L gas and H gas in 2006 and 2007 
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Capacity of the border points (in m
3/h) 
Emden/Oude Statenzijl cluster  2,900,000  1,900,000  1,400,000 
Zelzate 285,000     
Winterswijk/Zevenaar cluster      5,080,000 
Hilvarenbeek     2,637,000 
Haanrade     21,000 
Tegelen     20,000 
Dinxperlo     1,250 
Zandvliet   149,200  200,000 
Zuid-Limburg cluster      2,847,000 
 
 
Booking and utilisation of the border capacity in 2006 and 2007, according to gas quality 
   E x p o r t        I m p o r t    
year  quality  G  G+  L   H   H   
           
2006 firm  available  133,355 18,997  676,191  100%  591,879  100%  297,671 100% 
 firm  contracted  100,806 18,997  580,334  85%  421,303  71%  297,671 100% 
 interruptible  contracted  0 0 0  0%  31,364  5%  85,530 29% 
 backhaul  contracted  8,385 0  7,915  2%  57,610  10%  5,634 2% 
 Total  allocation  36,358 5,546  255,539  36%  248,050  42%  227,627 76% 
                  
2007 firm  available  119,799 19,018  658,697  100%  581,937  100%  271,220 100% 
 firm  contracted  101,842 19,018  585,419  89%  387,391  67%  271,220 100% 
 interruptible  contracted  0 0 0  0%  18,209  3%  112,517 41% 
 backhaul  contracted  14,776 0  23,851  5%  78,736  14%  5,524 2% 
 Total  allocation  44,625 4,629  247,146  37%  283,246  49%  232,281 86% 
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Within the Netherlands gas of different quality is fed into the network. The difference between these types is 
indicated using the Wobbe index. In the Dutch network, four different gas qualities are distinguished on the 
basis of the Wobbe index: H gas, L gas, G gas and G+ gas. In this monitor the three gas qualities with the 
lowest Wobbe index (L gas, G gas and G+ gas) are summarised as L gas.  
 
Gas qualities and their (average) Wobbe index 
H gas  51.6    H gas 
L gas  46.5   
G+ gas  44.4  L gas 





In order to match the supply to the demand for different gas qualities, GTS can change the quality of gas 
using quality conversion. GTS has two methods of doing this: mixing and nitrogen fixation. In the case of 
mixing, streams of high (H gas) and low calorific (e.g. G gas) natural gas are mixed in order to create natural 
gas of an intermediate calorific value (for example G+ gas or L gas). In the event of nitrogen fixation; one gas 
quality (usually H gas) is ‘diluted’ with nitrogen to reach the desired calorific value.  
 
We calculated the utilisation of quality conversion from the total entry and exit per gas quality and the total 
use of nitrogen. Per hour it is calculated how much nitrogen is needed to create the net flow of L gas out of H 
gas, then how much nitrogen is needed to make G+ gas from H gas, and finally how much nitrogen is 
needed to make G gas from H gas. If not enough nitrogen is fed in that hour, it is assumed that the rest is 
made by mixing H gas and G gas.  
 
This calculation method does not correspond entirely with the reality however. It is significant that GTS does 
not work with the average Wobbe index, but with a bandwidth. Moreover every exit point has its own gas 
quality. Therefore the calculation in this monitor does not correspond to GTS’s adjusted quantity of KCE (see 
graph below).  
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NAM  Grijpskerk  Gas field  H gas  14,654,000 22,400 
NAM  Norg  Gas field  L gas  29,308,000 22,400 
TAQA  Alkmaar  Gas field  L gas  4,884,500 14,700 
Essent  Essent Epe  Salt cave  L gas  2,423,000 4,000 
Nuon  Nuon Epe  Salt cave  L gas  1,551,500 4,900 
RWE Kalle  aquifer  H  gas  2,480,000 4,600 
Gasunie  Maasvlakte  LNG installation  L gas  977,000 12,600 NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  90
 
In connection with the concentration on the market, the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) and the C3 are 
calculated for the various segments of the gas market.  
 
The HHI and C3 indices for the concentration of entry and exit of H and L gas, and of TTF trade and quality 
conversion in 2006 and 2007 
 
     
     
import  2,747  2,292  68.6%  63.9% 
production  2,283  2,159  73.5%  73.5% 
domestic entry  8,231  7,678  97.6%  95.7% 
export  6,063  6,192  95.7%  89.7% 
H gas 
domestic exit  4,207  2,266  91.0%  74.3% 
import  9,282  4,073  100.0%  88.5% 
production  9,668  9,724  99.9%  99.9% 
domestic entry  7,586  9,923  99.9%  100.0% 
export  9,832  9,347  99.9%  99.3% 
L gas 
domestic exit  5,927  5,833  96.4%  94.2% 
trade (TTF)  1,505  916  58.4%  43.0% 
   quality conversion  5,627  2,029  89.5%  70.6% 
 
 
The HHI and C3 indices for the concentration at specific import and export points for H and L gas in 2006 
and 2007 
 
     
     
Emden/OSZ cluster  3,495  5,661  96.2%  97.9%  Import capacity 
Zelzate  3,506  2,895  95.4%  87.0% 
Emden/OSZ cluster  2,350  2,263  61.9%  61.7%  Import volume 
Zelzate  4,453  2,516  94.4%  84.8% 
OSZ G cluster  8,997  6,610  98.6%  99.3% 
OSZ H cluster  3,626  5,619  88.5%  94.8%  Export capacity 
Zuid-Limburg cluster  8,559  4,947  98.1%  99.6% 
OSZ G cluster  9,062  9,076  99.7%  99.3% 
OSZ H cluster  3,794  3,684  90.7%  90.2%  Export volume 
Zuid-Limburg cluster  8,699  6,136  98.9%  91.8% 
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In order to get an idea of the development of the marketplace TTF, shippers were asked whether they thought 
aspects of the market were better or worse in 2007. The table below gives the average opinion of the 
respondents on the various aspects.  
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In the past years the gas markets of North West Europe have become more closely integrated. This can be 
seen from the correlations exhibited by the gas prices on the OTC markets in the Netherlands (TTF), Belgium 
(Zeebrugge), the UK (NBP) and Germany (BEB). These correlation coefficients are based on the OTC 
assessments of Platts. The prices of the BEB are listed from June 2007. The correlation is calculated from 
that moment.  
 
Correlation coefficients between the prices on TTF and other markets  
 2005  2006  2007  2005  2006  2007  2007 (from June) 
Day-ahead 0.77  0.90  0.99  0.77  0.92  0.99  0.96 
Month-ahead 0.95  0.83  1.00 0.95  0.84 1.00 0.97 
Year-ahead 0.94  0.93  0.98  0.96  0.93  0.98  - 
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Interconnection capacity: available, obtained, nominated (MW average 2007) 
 
Utilisation rate of interconnection capacity (% average 2007) 
 Germany  Belgium 
   All hours  Peak  Super peak  All hours  Peak  Super peak 
Import 80  81  82  55  56  61 
Export 9  9  9  22  21  15 
 
Full utilisation (hours in 2007) 
 Germany  Belgium 
   All hours  Peak  Super peak  All hours  Peak  Super peak 
Import 10  7  9  22  23  30 
Export 0  0  0  6  6  3 
 
Under-utilisation with favourable price difference (hours in 2007) 
 Germany 
   All hours  Peak  Super peak 
Import 46  52  54 
Export 11  11  10 
 
 
Price border auction import Germany (max E.ON, RWE) and scatter with price difference on markets (APX, 
EEX)  
 
 Germany  Belgium 
    Available Obtained Nominated  Available Obtained Nominated 
Import 2239  2237 1767 1316 717  717 
Export 2386  2113 211  1333 282 268 NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  96
 





8476 10116  7056  10514  8671 10300  7273  10586 
Import (MWh/h) 
 




41 32  48  30  37 26  46  24 
Unutilised import 
capacity (%) 
18 16  20  12  30 29  31  26 
Scarcity index (%) 
 
36 28  42  25  36 26  44  24 
HHI production 
- excluding import  2065  2100  2034  2120  2108  2146  2077  2156 
- including import  1700  1747  1658  1750  1828  1879  1784  1873 
HHI capacity
67 
- excluding import  2052  2025  2075  2026  2076  2079  2074  2079 
- including import  1604  1595  1611  1597  1592  1599  1586  1599 








1.17 1.00    0.96  1.20 0.96    0.92 
                                                           
67 The production capacity is related to all production units with a maximum electric capacity greater than 15 
MW. This is about 80% of the total production capacity in the Netherlands. The import capacity is included 
by assigning the available import capacity in blocks of 400 MW to the five largest producers and the 
remaining capacity in blocks of 400 MW to new parties. This 400 MW is the maximum capacity that a market 
party can secure.  
68 The calculation of the pivotal supplier index (PSI) is based on the available capacity: power plants that 
market parties can put into use at any moment (or in fact choose to do so to a limited degree or not at all) in 
order to produce electricity. Power plants that are currently defective or undergoing maintenance or revision 
(fall-out) are not included. Account is also taken of the possible must run nature of power plants. Industrial 
WKK units have in general extremely limited flexibility. For this reason most of these units are not included in 
the PSI analysis. WKK units for district heating on the other hand are in general well able to regulate the 
production of electricity for the public network at will. That is why most district heating WKKs are included. 
For these district heating or industrial WKK units which are partially flexibly utilisable, correction has been 
made in the analysis for the must run part.  
69 The RSI is calculated (on hourly basis) by dividing per player the collective capacity of all other players (so 
the total available capacity minus the available capacity of the relevant player) into the market demand. The NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  97
 
Market outcomes of the electricity market, average per hour, 2006 and 2007 
 
 
Electricity price (euro/MWh): 
- APX 
  
58 80 39 91  42 58 28 65 
- OTC day 
 
 83  54      59  38   
 
Fuel prices 
- gas (euro/MWh)  20  20  20  20  15  15  15  15 
- coal (euro/MWh)  7        9       
- CO2 (euro/tonne)  17        1       
 
Spreads (euro/MWh): 
           
- spark month  15        12       
- clean spark month  7        11       
- dark year  45        34       
 
System marginal costs (euro/MWh): 
- actual dispatch  76  83  69  86  64  66  63  67 




47 44  51  44  81  71  89 70 
 
Markup 
- actual dispatch  -22  0  -42  10  -33  -10  -54  2 
- optimal dispatch  9  40  -17  56  15  49  -16  67 
 
Average degree of 
coverage
71 
2.8      2.0     
                                                                                                                                                                                     
calculation of the RSI is based on the same basic data as that used to calculate the PSI. Account is therefore 
taken of the fall-out of power plants and the possible must run nature of power plants.  
70 If all relevant (technical and economic) information is known, a dynamic dispatch model can be used to 
calculate the optimal dispatch. Another simple and therefore more approximate method is to determine the 
optimal dispatch on the basis of the merit order and then to compare the marginal system costs with optimal 
dispatch to those in reality. This is the method we followed here, knowing that in reality more factors 
determine the dispatch than are included with the merit order. The dispatch inefficiency in this analysis 
depends on which power plant is the marginal one and how long this plant runs (in connection with the 
startup costs). 
71 The average of the degree of coverage per player. The degree of coverage is the ratio between the annual 
profit per MW and the annual costs per MW of an investment in a new power plant. The starting points here 
are: investment amount is 1 million euros, discount rate of 7% and running time of the investment is 25 
years.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  98
Concentration rate (HHI) for capacity, including and excluding import, 2006 and 2007 
 
 
Concentration rate (HHI) for production, including and excluding import, 2006 and 2007 
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Electricity price per day, average per peak hours and off-peak hours, 2006 and 2007 
   
 
Gas price (TTF) and coal price, daily average in 2006 and 2007 
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Dark spread, monthly contracts 
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Ranking of type of plant according to height of marginal costs, averaged over all hours per six months in 
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Results of regression analysis of relationship between markup on the one hand and scarcity, RSI, gas price on 
the other  
  2006  2007  2006 en 2007 




























2  40%  50%  40% 
Number of observations  8,686  8,566  17,252 
Note: standard error in parenthesis; *** Significant on level of 1%  
 
 
Results of comparison of dispatch inefficiency on the sector level and on the level of individual portfolios  







Sector 47  0.4  46.2  48.0   
Producer 1  37  0.4  35.8  37.2  18 
Producer 2  34  0.5  32.9  34.7  21 
Producer 3  11  0.2  10.3  11.1  77 
Producer 4  50  0.5  49.0  50.8  -4 
2007 
Sector 81  0.6  80.1  82.4   
Producer 1  17  0.2  16.3  17.2  104 
Producer 2  12  0.4  10.8  12.4  99 
Producer 3  13  0.4  12.5  14.0  99 
Producer 4  25  0.3  24.5  25.7  86 
                                                           
72 Test of whether dispatch inefficiency of player x deviates significantly from the dispatch inefficiency on the 
sector level. NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  103
 
 
Spread between bid and offer prices on the Dutch OTC market (% average 2007) 
 2006  2007 
   Basic  Peak
73 Basic  Peak 
Monthly contracts  1.34  3.45  1.35  2.60 
Quarter contracts  1.09  3.38  1.22  2.14 
Year contracts  0.94  2.06  0.79  1.27 
 
Volatility of the prices on the Dutch OTC market (% average 2007) 
 2006  2007 
    Basic Peak  Basic Peak 
Monthly contracts  1.68  1.96  2.17  2.83 
Quarter contracts  0.95  1.39  1.12  1.33 
Year contracts  0.75  0.86  0.63  0.68 
 
 
In the main text the development of the bid/offer spread and volatility on the OTC market is illustrated for 
monthly contracts. This appendix also presents the year contracts.  
 
Spread between bid and offer prices OTC for year contracts (base), duration curves 




                                                           
73 The months April and May in 2006 showed exceptionally high spreads. These highs had a significant 
influence on the annual average for 2006.  NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  104
Spread between bid and offer prices OTC for year contracts (base), month data 
 
Volatility of the OTC prices for year contracts (base), duration curves 
 
Volatility of the OTC prices for year contracts (base), month data NMa Energy Markets Monitor 2007  105
Price development for OTC year contracts (base) in the Netherlands, Germany, France 2005-2007 
 
Spread between bid and offer prices (% average 2007) 
 The  Netherlands  Germany  France 
    Basic Peak  Basic Peak  Basic Peak 
Monthly contracts  1.35  2.60  1.41  1.22  1.60  1.56 
Quarter contracts  1.22  2.14  119  1.11  1.32  1.49 
Year  contracts  0.79 1.27  0.58 0.62 0.62 1.05 
 
Volatility of the prices (% average 2007) 
 The  Netherlands  Germany  France 
    Basic Peak  Basic Peak  Basic Peak 
Monthly contracts  2.17  2.83  2.28  2.94  2.51  3.02 
Quarter contracts  1.12  1.33  1.11  1.35  1.43  2.00 
Year contracts  0.63  0.68  0.57  0.56  0.70  0.67 
 
International comparison of spread between bid and offer prices and volatility of the OTC prices for year 
contracts (base), per quarter in 2007 
 